Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons from  Lilly v. Canada by Gervais, Daniel J.
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2018
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Human Rights
and Regulatory Lessons from "Lilly v. Canada"
Daniel J. Gervais
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation




Daniel J. Gervais, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons from Lilly v.






Vanderbilt University Law School
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Wed Jan 23 11:20:50 2019
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your 
 acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions 
 of the license agreement available at 
 https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF 
                                     to your smartphone or tablet device 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons
from Lilly v. Canada
Daniel J. Gervais*
The triangular interface between trade, intellectual proper*j (IP)
and human aghts has yet to be fully formed, both doctrinally and
normatively. Adding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) to the mix
increases the complexity of the equations to solve. Two resultant issues
are explored in this Article. First, the Article considers ways in which
broaderpublicpolig objectives-in particular, the protection of human
nghts-can and should be factored into determinations of whether a
state's action is compatible with its trade oblgations and commitments
in the state-to-state dispute settlement context. Second, the Article
examines whether doctrinal tools used in state-to-state, trade-dispute
settlement o make room for public interest considerations port to the
investment/ISDS context. The Article uses the recent Lilly v. Canada
case as backdrop to illustrate the points made. The Lilly case dealt with
an ISDS complaint filed after the revocation of two Canadian patents
on pharmaceutical products. The Article approaches the above-
mentioned triangular interface from a poli perspective that factors in
innovation and investment protection, but also public health, a policy
area supported by a human right (to health), and in which states need
regulatory autonomy.
Ph.D., MAE, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Disclaimer: the Author was an
expert retained by Canada in the Lill arbitration. The views expressed are the Author's own, however.
The Author is grateful to participants at the "IP and Human Rights" symposium at UC Irvine School
of Law (October 2016); participants in the Institute of European Studies of Macau "IP as Property"
seminar (November 2016); and attendees at my public lecture on the Lily case at the Centre for
International Intellectual Property Studies in Strasbourg (January 10, 2017) for their useful comments
on an early draft of this Article. Thanks also to Jose Alvarez, Joel Trachtman and Susy Frankel. All
errors are entirely mine.
459
460 UC IRTINE LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 8:459
Introduction ..................................................... 460
II. Lilly v. Canada ........... .... ................................. .................................. 468
A. The Complaint .................................... ....... 469
B. Canada's Counter-M em orial..................... ................................ 471
C. The Role of Chapter 17 .................................... 474
D. Lilly's Change of Approach ......................... ........ 477
E. Regulatory Flexibility ......... ................................ ........................... 478
III. Interfaces Between Intellectual Property, Human Rights, International
Trade & Investment ......................................... 479
A. Intellectual Property and Human Rights .................. .....480
B. Patents and Human Rights ..............................................482
C. The "Right to H ealth" in Context..............................................................484
IV. Doctrinal Interfaces ................................................... 489
A. Balancing Human Rights, Trade and Investment ........ ........ 489
B. Incorporating Human Rights in Trade and Investment Disputes........490
C. Contractarian Approaches .................................. 493
1. Filling N orm ative Lacunae .... ..... ................... ..................... 493
2. Incomplete Contracts .................................. 495
D. Express Interfaces ........................................ 499
1. Trade .................................... ........... 499
2. ISDS ................................ ............... 502
V . Specific W ays Forw ard...................................................................... 504
A . T he P uzzle................ .............................................. 504
B. Parameters of an Optimal Human Rights/ISDS Interface ................... 505
C. Directed Interpretation ..................................................506
D. Expressly Reserving Regulatory Autonomy ..................... 509
E. Imposing Obligations on Investors ................... ........ 509
F. Factoring in Unintended Consequences..........................510
Conclusion............................................................. 511
INTRODUCTION
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a controversial topic. Its foray
into the area of intellectual property (IP) has increased the scope and depth of the
controversy. This incursion in the field of IP is the topic of this Article, which
explores the resulting controversy using an actual case-perhaps the most
prominent one to date-namely the complaint filed by Eli Lilly against Canada
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
under NAFTA Chapter 11.1 The Article uses this recently decided case to shed light
on what could go wrong in the ISDS and intellectual property interface.2
The Article considers the issues using two lenses. First, the Article uses a
human right lens, echoing Philip Alston's sentiment that the "relationship between
human rights and trade is one of the central issues confronting international lawyers
at the beginning of the twenty-first century.. . ."3 Second, the Article uses a
regulatory lens to see how ISDS might impact a state's ability to regulate not just
human rights, but also other key areas of public policy.
Let us first situate ISDS in its international legal context. The nineteenth and
twentieth centuries saw international law progress along two axes. First, maintaining
state sovereignty as a fundamental tenet, international law began to function in a
more "business-like" fashion, getting states to make bargains in which they would
limit their sovereign powers in exchange for similar concessions by other states.4 At
the same time, however, international lawyers and scholars gradually devised "a
programme for the economic and material betterment of the human race."5 This
effort was eventually "re-cast into one of global freedom of economic intercourse
on a liberal capitalist basis."6
The sovereignty of states remained a cornerstone of the international law
edifice erected during this period. This is reflected, inter alia, in the Lotus doctrine,
according to which all that is not prohibited by a rule of international law is
permitted.7 Similarly the International Court of Justice stated, in Militay and
Paramiitaiy Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), that "in
international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the
State concerned, by treaty or otherwise .... ."8 The theoretical scope of a state's
sovereignty thus depends on what is prohibited by a treaty or other source of
international law. A realist might add that, in practice, this also depends on who
decides what the law is, whether it was violated, and whether those decisions are
enforceable.
The role that state sovereignty should play is still a matter of much discussion
in international law, and the Lotus doctrine's preeminence regularly comes under
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32
I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICS1D Case No. UNCT/14/2, Judgment
(Mar. 17, 2017).
2. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3544/DC10133_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJ6Q-ZXSKI [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award].
3. Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Jughts by Trade Law: A Reply
to Petersmann, 13 EUR.J. INT'LL. 815, 818 (2002).
4. Stephen C. Neff, A Short History of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 37-42
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
5. Id. at 42.
6. Id.
7. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 269 (Jun. 27).
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fire. In his opinion in the Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), for example,
Judge Alvarez of the International Court ofJustice wrote that the principle reflected
in the doctrine "formerly correct, in the days of absolute sovereignty, is no longer
so at the present day: the sovereignty of States is henceforth limited not only by the
rights of other States but also by other factors . . . which make up what is called the
new international law," including the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions
passed by the Assembly of the United Nations.
9
The Lotus doctrine certainly does not provide a full normative key to
understanding the nature of the Westphalian order.
10 For instance, it does not
explain whether a state is "naturally" sovereign because it sits at the top of the
international legal hierarchy or is a mere organ-and thus also a subject-of
international law. If the latter is true, then an international court can "naturally" be
called upon to decide if a state is acting within the bounds of the law. If one
considers the former option to be correct, then states must willingly accept the
jurisdiction of an international court and submit to its findings.
11
One way to frame this debate more productively is to consider that states have
sovereignty, but that the exercise of sovereignty can come with obligations. A key
question is then the enforcement of such obligations by, or on behalf of a
supranational institution, such as the United Nations (UN). The question whether
states have willingly accepted the jurisdiction or because one considers this
supranational institution as having a natural role in doing so is pushed towards the
background of the doctrinal picture.12 Hans Kelsen and his former student, Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht, argued that the United Nations system should include a court
with compulsory jurisdiction with a limited mandate to maintain peace.'
3 Kelsen first
voiced this idea in 1934.14 In the end, however, the Kelsenian dream would not fully
materialize, as the International Court ofJustice's jurisdiction is not the "Big Court"
9. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.),Judgment, 1951 1.C.J. Rep. 116, at 152 (Dec. 18).
10. The Westphalian order or system emerged after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). It is based
on the principle of territorial integrity of sovereign states, which is seen as the primary
institutional agent of international law and relations. See Joanna Kulesza & Roy Balleste, Signs and
Portents in Cyberspace: The Rise ofJus Internet as a New Order in International Law, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1311, 1317-18 (2013).
11. Mario Patrono, Hans Kelsen: A Peacemaker Throngb Law, 45 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON
L. REV. 647, 649 (2014) ("According to Kelsen, the sovereignty becomes an attribute of the state as the
supreme legal order, that is, the sole legal order that doesn't derive its validity from a superior legal
order, but enjoys its own independent validity.... If we admit the supremacy of international law over
domestic law, the 'sovereignty' would fade because the state, in Kelsen's view, would become a mere
organ of the international legal community.").
12. See Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations
Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 69-74 (1990)
(discussing the conditions for armed UN interventions in its member States).
13. Patrono, supra note 11, at 651. Lauterpacht became a member of the United Nations's
International Law Commission from 1952 to 1954 and.a judge of the International Court ofjustice
from 1955 to 1960.
14. HANs KELSEN, THE LEGAL PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 19 (1934) ("[T]he
greater the authority of an international court having jurisdiction over all disputes, the less necessary it
is to empower it expressly to apply any other than the positive law.").
[Vol. 8:459462
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he envisaged.15 For one thing, its jurisdiction is not compulsory for United Nations
members.16
A more powerful form of enforcement would indeed emerge-not in the field
of war and peace, but rather in the world of trade law. This is not altogether a huge
surprise. Indeed, the impulse to limit state sovereignty to prevent states from
behaving badly extended early on into the economic realm. Trade rules are viewed
in this context as a means to ensure that states, like Ulysses, limit their sovereignty
to withhold "protectionist sirens."17 Adding to those normative foundations, the
economist Friedrich Hayek suggested that free trade, viewed as a limit to the power
of states, was one of the best safeguards of peace.18 In his mind, this included limits
on the controls that a state might compose on trade and the economy more
broadly.'9 To that extent, human rights and trade could be said to share some high-
level objectives, and trade and foreign investment can be said to work hand-in-hand
with development.20
International economic liberalization and the enforcement of decisions against
states that fail to live up to their liberalization obligations can be traced along three
inflection points. The first was the failed attempt to establish an International Trade
Organization (ITO) at the Havana conference in 1948, coupled with the successful
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutional framework.21 Although the ITO
negotiations failed to establish a new intergovernmental institution, they did yield
15. Grant Gilmore, International Court of Justice, 55 YALE L.J. 1049, 1064 (1946).
16. States adhering to the Court may recognize the Court's jurisdiction as "compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same
obligation." Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 36, para. 2, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
17. Peter-Tobias Stoll, Constitutional Perspectives on International Economic Law, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: LIBER
AMICORUM FOR ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN 201, 202 (Marise Cremona et al. eds., 2014).
18. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, T-iE: ROAD TO SERFDOM 175 (1944).
19. Id. Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, in his noted 1991 book, advocated limiting the
power of states, inter alia, to guarantee free trade but he offered a different argument, or at least a
different version of Hayek's argument. See ERNST-ULRC-I PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 221-44
(1991).
20. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Reghts and International Trade Law: Defining and
Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29 (Thomas Cottier,Joost
Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Bilrgi Bonanomi eds., 2005) ("From the point of view of human rights, the
history of international law, including international trade law, could be written as a history of abuses of
foreign policy powers to the detriment of general citizen-interests."); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical
Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 768 (2005) (arguing that corporations are often in a better position than states to
promote development).
21. For a historical account of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a stand-
alone instrument and the failure of the Havana Charter, see Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade
Organigation: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INTL. L. 349, 353 (1995) ("With the
failure of the Havana Charter and the ITO, the GATT became the principal international agreement
regulating trade between nations."). On Bretton Woods, see John C. Thomure, Jr., The Uneasy Case for
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 21 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L. L. & COM. 181, 185-86 (1995).
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one important result, namely the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).22 The GATT included a state-to-state dispute settlement system
that differed in at least two important respects from many of its international law
cousins: it was mandatory for GATT Contracting Parties and had "teeth," in the
form of trade-based retaliation against a party failing to implement an adverse
ruling.23 Those teeth were a bit fragile, however, because the losing party in a dispute
could oppose adoption of the dispute settlement report by the GATT Contracting
Parties and thus compromise its enforceabiity.24 According to Professor Hudec, a
number of disputes were not filed in the first place for political and other reasons,
thus further limiting the impact of the GATT dispute-settlement system. 25
A second inflection point in the strengthening of enforceability was the
establishment in 1995 of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which includes an
enhanced dispute-settlement system.26 The WTO's teeth, compared to those of the
previous GATT system, grew significantly longer. Clearly, "sovereignty" lost a
sizeable share of its normative heft in the WTO exercise. A number of key actors,
including multinational corporations, were pushing for tough norms to be imposed
on and enforced against states where they were doing (or were planning to do)
22. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/
CONF 2/78. The GATT was never ratified as a stand-alone treaty by the United States. It was adopted
by the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Star. A-2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States
Trade Law, 18 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 101, 142 n.72 (1992) ("[B]oth the GATT and the Protocol receive
their authority in United States law, not as a result of any direct congressional act, but rather through
Presidential agreement to and proclamation of the effectiveness of the Protocol of Provisional
Application. Proclamation No. 3513, 28 Fed.Reg. 107, 115 (1963).").
23. See Miquel Montafia i Mora, A GA TT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution
of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 128-31 (1993).
24. Because the GATT was basically a contract and not a typical intergovernmental organization
with "members," states party to it were simply called contracting parties. Acting together (as a group)
to take a collective decision, the capitalized plural CONTRACTING PARTIES was used. GATT
Article XXV.1 uses "CONTRACTING PARTIES," in all capital letters, to mean "the contracting
parties acting jointly." Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Star. A-3, at A-68, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, at 272. On the "veto" of a
party losing a dispute, see Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17
U. PA. J. INTL. ECON. L. 555, 564 (1996) ("General GATT practice was that the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, or the Council, would take action only if all parties agree; any individual nation could block
action. Thus, even the losing party to a dispute could block action by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
or the Council.").
25. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 185
(1993).
26. See Pieter Jan Kuijper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the European
Community, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 49, 57 (1995); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos
of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of W'TO Dispute Settlement, 13
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 177, 197 (2002) ("Inevitably, then, with ever increasing sophistication, the WTO
legal paradigm shift occasioned by the acceptance of compulsory adjudication with binding outcomes
has attracted most comment. And with good empirical justification. Measured in quantitative terms,
Panel and the Appellate Body activity under the new DSU can be described as frenetic. Equally
inevitably WTO dispute settlement in general and the Appellate Body and its jurisprudence in particular
are taking their rightful place as objects of reflection alongside other major transnational and
international courts.") (notes omitted).
[ ol. 8:459464
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business. This meant, inter alia, enforcing intellectual property rights and
establishing rules against expropriation. It led to the shift in the entire field of
intellectual property from a set of technical rules administered by its own UN
specialized agency (the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the
origins of which date back to the 1880s) to the world of trade, and eventually the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).27 A question that emerges in connection with this shift is whether the
WTO dispute settlement system is self-contained, or whether-and if so how-it
can consider norms extrinsic to the WTO regime, including human rights.28
The third and last inflection point represents a major step in the path towards
a further reduction in state sovereignty. That step is investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS), a process that forms part of most recent trade and investment
agreements. While all steps in the story systematically whittled away state
sovereignty, ISDS marks a paradigmatic shift. ISDS is the result of a move towards
recognizing the role of multinational corporations as international legal persons that
compete with states for the policy space or have a special say in policy setting
notably because they can offer direct investment in exchange for policy decisions.29
The two main contours of the so-called "post-Westphalian" system are: "1) limited
international legal personality for non-state actors; 2) qualified sovereignty for state
actors, partly but not exclusively due to a) devolution of sovereignty to local or private
entities (localization and privatization) and b) sublimation of sovereignty into
transnational international organizations."30 ISDS is a major step in that context:
multinational corporations are given a right to sue states in binding and mandatory
arbitration proceedings.31
27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 27-34, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. On the impacts of the shift of IP to trade, see Daniel Gervais, Human
Rzghts and the Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89, 92-93 (C. Geiger ed., 2016).
28. See Shoaib A. Ghias, International judicial Lammaking: A Theoretical and Political Analysis
of the WTO Appellate Body, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 534, 553 (2006); Alec Sweet,]eudiciali.ation and
the Construction of Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 63, 64-65 (Martin
Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002).
29. See Christen Broecker, Note, "Better the Devil You Know": Home State Approaches to
Transnational Corporate Accountability, 41 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 159, 184-85 (2008) (showing how
corporations use the investment carrot to affect poorer states' policies).
30. Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: The Post- Westphalian
Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC LAW REV. 23, 45 (2004) (emphasis added).
31. See Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA
J. INT'LL. 1, 31 (2011) (suggesting that "international lawyers should spend their time addressing which
international rules apply to corporations rather than whether corporations are or are not "subjects" of
international law); Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach To Multinational
Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 489-90 (2001). Interestingly, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2d Cit. 2010), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
that corporate liability was not a rule of customary international law applicable under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 5 1350 (2012).
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Specifically, ISDS provides multinational corporations a right to sue states that
are parties to an investment treaty (such as a bilateral investment treaty or BIT) or
a trade agreement containing an investment protection chapter for direct or indirect
expropriation, referred to together as international investment treaties (IIAs).
32
Investment protection clauses are now standard in IIAs.
33 According to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as of 2015 there
were 3,304 known HAs (2,946 BITs and 358 other treaties with. investment
provision (TIPs)), not all of which are in force, however.
34
The emergence of ISDS goes well beyond the mere recognition of
international legal personality for multinational corporations: it marks a sharp turn
in the regulation of the activities of such corporations by individual states where
they invest and do business. The scope of the shift compared to state-to-state
dispute settlement (i.e., among "equals") can be measured by comparing ISDS
with the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
UN General Assembly.35 The Charter notes, inter alia, that states have the
right "[t]o regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within
[their] national jurisdiction and [to] take measures to ensure that such
activities . . . conform with [their] economic and social policies."
36 It imposes a duty
on transnational corporations not to "intervene in the internal affairs of a host
State."37 ISDS is arguably exactly the opposite. Where states A and B have agreed
to an ISDS obligation in a treaty, ISDS provides a binding forum where a
corporation in state A can challenge a measure taken by the government of state B
affecting the corporation's investments in state B.
38
ISDS was and probably still is a good idea to attract foreign investment,
especially in countries where the legal system may not be effective at imposing
remedies against the state. It is so widespread, however, that it no longer marks a
comparative advantage (over states that do not provide it); instead states that do not
32. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2016: INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES 101, U.N. Sales No. E.16.II.D.4
(2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir
201 6en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TMX-
24B3] [hereinafter UNCTAD REPORT].
33. See David R. Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the
Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 147, 147-49 (2004) (investor-state arbitration is a
standard feature of IIAs concluded since the 1980s).
34. See UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 32, at 101. Not all of those instruments are currently in
force.
35. G.A Res. 3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974).
36. Id. art. 2(2).
37. Id.
38. See Timothy J. Feighery, Rule of Law in the Emerging Development Agenda: On Finding the
Optimal Role for Investment Treaties, 21 SW. J. INT'L L. 297, 299 (2015) ("The ISDS may broadly be
defined as an international law-based system that is founded mostly on thousands of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) and some multilateral investment-related treaties that protect, on a reciprocal
basis, the investors of each state when they make investments in other states... . By this system,
sovereigns agree toprivatige the dispute resolution process for covered investments. In this way, foreign
investors are protected against the traditional home field advantage that sovereigns may enjoy via their
national court systems.").
[ ol. 8:459466
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have investment protection (including ISDS) may be at a comparative
disadvantage.39
The first plurilateral agreement to contain ISDS provisions was NAFTA. 40
ISDS forms part of the second version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.41 It likely
will form part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)-if
that agreement is ever finalized-which itself is modeled after a vast number of
bilateral investment agreements (BITs).42 Put differently, ISDS is here, and it seems
here to stay. Indeed, "[w]ith 70 cases initiated in 2015, the number of new treaty-
based investor-state arbitrations set a new annual high. Following the recent trend,
a high share of cases (40 per cent) was brought against developed countries."43 ISDS
provisions already bind (or soon may) the United States with most of its significant
trading partners, including Canada, Mexico, and the EU, and its importance is
growing.44 ISDS has (finally) started to make the headlines, for example in the
39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
40. NAFTA, supra note 1; see Vivian H.W. Wang, Note, Investor Protection or Environmental
Protection? "Green" Development under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 260 (2007) ("The
inclusion of an ISDS-type mechanism within a BIT was first adopted in NAFTA and was heralded as
an advancement in the resolution of international trade disputes as it 'grant[ed] individual foreign
investors standing to sue host governments without requiring the participation or acquiescence of the
investor's home government."') (notes omitted); see also William L. Owens & R. Andrew Fitzpatrick,
Investment Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Threat to Soverezgny of Member States?, 39
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 55 (2015). Investment protection emerged in the bilateral investment treaty between
Germany and Pakistan of Nov. 25, 1959. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with
Protocol and Exchange of Notes), Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24. As far as the United
States is concerned, ISDS provisions were first used in the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Republic of Panama Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments of Oct. 27,
1982, art. VII. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama Concerning
the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Pan., Oct. 27, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-14
(1991).
41. The "new version" refers to the new text reportedly agreed in January 2018 by eleven
countries following the withdrawal of the United States from the pact in January 2017. See James
Fernyhough, The TPP is Going Ahead, and Not Everyone in Australia is Happy, THE NEw DAILY
(Jan. 28,2018,3:48 PM), https://thenewdaly.com.au/money/finance-news/2018/01/24/tpp-going-
ahead/ Ihttps://perma.cc/8ZU-W23F].
42. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial, European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS, 25 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 963, 964 (2014) ("The ISDS chapter in the TTIP is essentially modelled (for good and for bad) on
similar regimes in thousands (1) of BITs in force all over the world. Almost all European Member States,
among them the shrillest objectors to the ISDS in the TTIP, are not only signatories to such agreements
but are heavy users thereof."). While BITs by definition contain "investment protection" in the form
of ISDS, not all TIPs contain them, though a clear majority do. Of the 358 TIPs just mentioned, 132
contained investment provisions similar to those in BITs, and another thirty-two contained "limited"
investment protection (for example, national treatment with respect to commercial presence or free
movement of capital relating to direct investments). See UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 32, at 102.
43. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 32, at xii.
44. See Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 246-47 (2006) ("Although investor-state arbitration dates back at least
to the Jay Treaty of 1794, in recent years the number of investment arbitration proceedings has
increased dramatically. To illustrate: claimants filed a total of three treaty-based cases with the World
Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) from its inception through
1994. In the next ten years-through November 2004-claimants filed an additional 103 cases.
Investment arbitrations also are notable for their high stakes: claimants regularly seek to recover
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United States in 2016 when the Keystone XL pipeline project was rejected by
President Obama.45 That specific example was heralded as evidence of ISDS giving
corporations too much power over sovereign public policy decisions.
46 One can
fairly ask, therefore, whether and if so how ISDS meshes with a state's right to
regulate its own public policy within its borders.
Limits on state sovereignty are often well-grounded, for example, when they
are supported by a benevolent world community policing human rights.
47 But what
happens when international law is used to limit the protection of human or
fundamental rights that a state (or supranational body, such as the European Union)
wants to protect (in the form of a limit on an intellectual property right or restriction
on the use of personal data, for example) because it could amount to an alleged
expropriation? This is where ISDS takes us now, as it is used to enforce investment
protection with little or no doctrinal space to acknowledge-let alone defer to-
human rights and other public interest norms and associated policies that a state
might wish to apply in its own territory. That, in a nutshell, is the issue at the core
of this Article.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, the Article presents the Lilly case,
which it uses to explicate how human rights issues might arise in the context of
ISDS cases involving intellectual property. In Part III, the Article examines various
aspects of the substantive interface between trade, investment, intellectual property,
and human rights. This includes the (human) right to health and the regulation of
pharmaceutical products from a public health perspective. Part IV reviews various
doctrinal mechanisms used (with varying degrees of success) in a trade context to
solve this complex equation and considers whether these mechanisms can be used
in an ISDS context. Part V offers paths forward.
II. LILLY V. CANADA
This Part provides the reader not familiar with the details of the Lilly case with
a glimpse into the arguments made by the parties that are relevant for the purposes
of this Article. It is not intended to provide a full picture of the case.
48
hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, and the claims may involve sensitive issues of national
policy.") (footnotes omitted).
45. See Dillon Fowler, Comment, Keystonewalled: TransCanada's Discrimination Claim Under
NAFTA and the Future of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 31 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 103, 105 (2016).
46. See id. at 130 ("[T]he fact that TransCanada is suing the United States government at all
shows that Chapter 11 provides corporations with too much leverage over elected governments
through the current model of ISDS.").
47. Peter Millet, The Pinochet Case - Some Personal Reflections, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 10
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006) ("No longer is international law a matter which concerns
sovereign States alone. It marches with human rights law to protect individuals from State action. The
world community has finally decided that the way a sovereign State treats its own nationals is not a
purely internal matter.").
48. For documents concerning the case, including briefs submitted by all parties, see Eli Lilly
and Company v. the Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, ITAIAW,
http://www.italaw.com/cases/16
2 5 [ https://perma.cc/EM3H-GJYT] (last visited June 21, 2018).
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Lilly v. Canada was heard at the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the forum of choice for NAFTA investor-state
disputes, and according to the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules.49 ICSID is known for the confidentiality and
effectiveness of its services.50 Hearings are not public and calls for more
transparency have been made, although memorials (briefs) and expert reports, as
well as tribunal orders are generally made available to the public on the ICSID
website.5
The award (decision) of the tribunal was made available in March 2017.52 Let
us examine Lilly's claims and Canada's response.
A. The Complaint
Eli Lilly's complaint against Canada was filed under chapter 11 of NAFTA.5 3
That chapter is meant to protect investments made in a NAFTA party by a company
based in another NAFTA party.54 Interestingly, although "intellectual property" is
often mentioned in IIAs in the definition of "investment," this is not the case in
NAFTA, at least not directly.5 5 The inclusion of intellectual property in the
definition of the term "investment" is controversial from a normative perspective
when it leads to a challenge to a state's intellectual property and innovation policy.5 6
49. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120, at 643; see also Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes,
Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines-Eli Lilly v. Canada
and the Trans-Pactfic Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14 (2015) (ICSID handles the
"vast majority of investor-state dispute resolution claims."). ICSID was established by the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 1,
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. UNCITRAL is the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law. As of April 1, 2014, UNCITRAL has added to its arbitration rules. See UNITED
NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN
TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA44-
XD79].
50. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of
the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, I AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 97, 103
(1986).
51. See generaly J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State
Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681 (2007)
(advocating for the formal adoption of transparency rules by NAFTA to address legitimacy concerns
in investor-state arbitration).
. 52. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶¶ 198, 310, 349. The Award was made
available to the parties on March 16,2017. The Parties had ten days to identify confidential information,
if any, in the award before its release to the public ten days later.
53. See id. at T 95.
54. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11.
55. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
arts. 1 (Definitions), 6.5 (2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SLP2-ED99] [hereinafter 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT]; see also Susan K. Sell, TRIPS-Plus
Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REv. 41, 41 (2007). In NAFTA, the
"indirect" mention is in Article 1110(7), discussed below. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
56. See Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment"? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1121, 1124 (2014) ("Although the
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One could argue that it would be much less so, or even not controversial at all, if
the inclusion of intellectual property were limited to actual expropriation (e.g., when
state A takes the title to a patent or copyright belonging to company B to keep it or
transfer it to a third party).
Actual expropriation is not the fact pattern in Lilly v. Canada. The Lilly case
relates to the invalidation of two Canadian patents on its drugs Zyprexa and Strattera
(atomoxetine and olanzapine) by Canadian courts for failure to meet one of the core
patentability criteria, namely the utility requirement, one of the basic patentability
criteria in U.S. and Canadian patent law.5 7 The claimant (Lilly) contended that the
adoption of a "new, radically different standard for determining whether inventions
fulfill that requirement" (the "promise of the patent" doctrine discussed below)
amounted to an "uncompensated expropriation, in violation of Article 1110 of
NAFTA." 58 The claimant alleged that the promise of the patent doctrine violated
the intellectual property chapter (Chapter 17) of NAFTA, which "requires Canada
to provide patents to inventions, in all fields of technology, that are 'new, result
from an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application [i.e., have utility]',"
arguing that if "Canada can unilaterally reinterpret a core legal term in such a stark
manner and with such severe consequences, legally operative words in NAFTA with
internationally-accepted meanings could be susceptible to unilateral re-definition,
such that NAFTA will no longer establish foundational requirements for patent
protection."5 9 In other words, Lilly was trying to use investment chapter of NAFTA
to challenge the compatibility of the application of a patentability criterion by
Canadian courts (in which it undeniably received due process) with Canada's
substantive IP obligations in the patent section of chapter 17 of NAFTA, which are
broadly similar to those in the TRIPS agreement.
60 The word "unilateral" used twice
in the short quotation above betrays Lilly's thinking: the exercise of state sovereignty
is seen as a "unilateral" measure.
A second line of Lilly's argument was that the interpretation of the notion of
utility by Canadian courts violated Canada's obligations to afford "fair and equitable
treatment" (FET) to Lilly's investments under Article 1105 of NAFTA.
61
definition of 'investment' contained in most investment treaties mention intellectual property, the
obligations, expectations, and enforcement aspects of these treaties are largely undeveloped. Moreover,
the doctrinal, policy, and structural differences between BITs and the TRIPS Agreement have rarely
been meaningfully analyzed, leaving a gap in the international law of intellectual property. That is the
gap Eli Lilly now seeks to exploit."). This Article returns to this issue in greater depth infa Parts IV, V.
57. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant's Memorial, at
1 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
404 6 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/N22P-587H] [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Claimant's Memorial].
58. Id. at 1-2.
59. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
60. For a discussion of NAFTA Chapter Seventeen and TRIPS, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada,
ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of Daniel J. Gervais, at 18-20 (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4l39.pdf [https://perma.cc/
69GZ-5BP9] [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co v. Canada, Expert Report of Daniel J. Gervais].
61. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 57, at 6.
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Specifically, Lilly alleged that the promise of the patent doctrine violated: (i)
protection against arbitrary treatment (the doctrine is completely unpredictable and
unreasonably difficult to satisfy); (ii) protection of legitimate, investment-backed
expectations; and (iii) protection against discriminatory treatment.62
Lilly also argued that it "relied on Canada's patent law when it sought patent
protection for Zyprexa and Strattera and launched those drugs in Canada," and that
the patents had been issued "after a careful review by Canada's patent examiners in
light of Canada's utility requirement at the time." 63 These last two arguments, it
seems, could be rephrased as arguing that any invalidation by a court of an issued
patent amounts to expropriation, and that any significant change in the
interpretation of a patentability criterion could also amount to expropriation under
NAFTA.
B. Canada's Counter-Memorial
In its counter-memorial, the Government of Canada noted, first, that the
claimant received due process before Canadian courts (a fact not in dispute) and
was simply disappointed with the outcome of two patent trials. That did not amount
to a breach of the relevant obligations. Rather, according to the respondent, "[t]he
threshold for a violation of the minimum standard of treatment is high and requires
a finding of egregious or manifestly unfair behaviour" under customary
international law.64 Specifically, Canada alleged that the claimant had failed "to
prove that the theory of 'legitimate expectations' has become a rule of customary
international law" protected by NAFTA Article 1105(1) and, moreover, that
"regardless of its status generally in international law, it is a doctrine which
fundamentally cannot be applied to judgments of the domestic judiciary acting in
an adjudicative function of domestic statutory interpretation."65
On the issue of the alleged change in the interpretation of the utility
requirement by Canadian courts, Canada countered on several fronts. It noted that:
[E]ven if the theory of legitimate expectations is now a rule of custom
protected under Article 1105(1), Claimant could not have had a "legitimate
expectation" of how a court would rule in the future in light of the law,
facts, evidence and other considerations presented before the court at the
time of challenge. To assert otherwise would give every disappointed
litigant an automatic remedy in international law against any adverse
domestic ruling that it "expected" to win.66
62. Id. at 6-7.
63. Id at 7.
64. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Government of Canada
Counter Memorial, at 94, (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw413l.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3K3-LTMB] [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada,
Government of Canada Counter Memorial].
65. Id. at 115.
66. Id.; see also Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, Litigating intellectual Property R ghts in Investor-
State Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law
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The United States, in a submission noted along similar lines that:
The concept of "legitimate expectations" is not a component element
of "fair and equitable treatment" under customary international law that
gives rise to an independent host State obligation. An investor may develop
its own expectations about the legal regime governing its investment, but
those expectations impose no obligations on the State under the minimum
standard of treatment. The United States is aware of no general and
consistent State practice and opinio juris establishing an obligation under
the minimum standard of treatment not to frustrate investors'
expectations . . . . Moreover, the concept of "legitimate expectations" is
particularly inapt in the context of judicial measures.
67
Canada also argued that the "promise of the patent" doctrine was not new in
Canadian law, as Canadian academics and a well-known Canadian expert retained
by the government of Canada demonstrated.
68 A 1981 quote from the Supreme
Court of Canada opinion should suffice to illustrate the validity of Canada's
argument:69
There is a helpful discussion in Halsbuy's Laws of England, (3rd ed.),
vol. 29, at p. 59, on the meaning of 'not useful' in patent law. It means 'that
the invention will not work, either in the sense that it will not operate at all
or, more broadly, that it will not do what the specfication promises that it will
do'. . . . The discussion in Halsbury's Laws ofEngland ... continues:
... the practical usefulness of the invention does not matter,
nor does its commercial utility, unless the specification promises
commercial utility, nor does it matter whether the invention is of any
real benefit to the public, or particularly suitable for the purposes
suggested....
and concludes:
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 52, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2463711 [https://perma.cc/9RW3-PU3A] ("In Eli Lilly vs. Canada, the
investor hence cannot legitimately expect from the grant of patents by the Canadian Patent Office
(CPO) that those remain free from any validity challenges in the courts. Also a change in how the
Canadian courts apply patentability standards such as utility or the disclosure obligation as such does
not affect legitimate investor expectations . . . .").
67. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Submission of the United States
of America, at 4-5 (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7175.pdf [https://perma.cc/29U3-ET6V] [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Submission of
the United States of America] (footnotes omitted) (made as NAFTA parties not involved in a dispute
can do under NAFTA Article 1128).
68. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of Ronald
E. Dimock (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw4138.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PBP-YZYP] Ihereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Expert Report
of Ronald E. Dimock]; Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada andAround
the World, 30 CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REv. 35, 35 (2014).
69. See Consolboard Inc. v. Macltillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 504, 524 (Can.).
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... it is sufficient utility to support a patent that the invention gives
either a new article, or a better article, or a cheaper article, or affords
the public a useful choice....
Canadian law is to the same effect. . .70
It seems plain from the above that promises made by a patent applicant in
patent specifications were considered relevant and clearly were a known factor in
utility analyses in Canadian law, at least as far back as 1981. The tribunal agreed with
Canada on that point.7' Canada's counter-memorial also noted in this context that,
even ifthe promise of the patent doctrine was considered to change the interpretation
of the utility criterion, changes in the interpretation of patentability criteria by courts
in all three NAFTA parties are common, and sometimes significant.72 This
happened recently in several opinions of the United States Supreme Court for
example.73 Here again, the tribunal agreed.74
Lilly tried to argue that the notion of utility in Canada should be defined
basically the same way that it is in the United States (and therefore practically
nonexistent as a substantive threshold). Canada countered that (i) the U.S.
definition is not internationally binding on other nations and (ii) that the notion of
utility does different normative work (if any) in the United States because the
notions of written description and enablement (which do not exist as such in
Canadian law) perform essentially the same function as the Canadian notion of
utility.75
Relatedly, Lilly argued, as Valentina Vadi explains, that it faced "more arduous
patent standards in Canada than a Canadian investor might face in other
70. See id. (emphasis added), quoted in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Expert Report of Ronald
E. Dimock, supra note 68, at 14 (original emphasis removed; emphasis added).
71. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, I 318-323.
72. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of Timothy
R. Holbrook, at 27-30 (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw4137.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX7L-JP6K]; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/
14/2, Expert Report of Hedwig Lindner, at 4 (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw4l36.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9K4-FDQL] (discussing Mexican law).
73. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
74. See Eli Lilly Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶¶ 310, 386 (noting that "evolution of
the law through court decisions is natural, and departures from precedent are to be expected" and
referring to "incremental and evolutionary changes" in the interpretation of the utility criterion).
75. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Government of Canada Counter Memorial, supra note 64, at
5 ("Claimant also fails to acknowledge that U.S. law reaches many of the same results as do Canada's
utility rules, through its analogous 'enablement' and 'written description' requirements."); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Second Report of Dr. Daniel Gervais, at 3 (Dec. 7,
2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ITA%20LAW%20701 8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QZP8-ZV37] [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Second Report of Dr. Daniel
Gervais] ("Claimant's argument now seems to be that only certain definitions of utility are acceptable
(basically, the current U.S. definition) under NAFTA.").
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jurisdictions, such as the United States and Europe."
7 6 As Vadi notes, "[T]his form
of extraterritorial analogy is highly unusual in national treatment claims before
arbitral tribunals, given the regulatory diversity of IP laws across the globe, and is
likely not going to be accepted by the Arbitral Tribunal."
77 Indeed, the Tribunal
noted that it was "difficult to see how a comparison across jurisdictions can
demonstrate a change over time within a single jurisdiction."
78
C The Role of Chapter 17
Canada disagreed both that there was a violation of the substantive intellectual
property chapter (Chapter 17) of NAFTA and the ISDS tribunal should consider
that alleged violation to begin with. The patent-related provisions contained in that
chapter, which was negotiated at about the same time as the TRIPS agreement, are
largely similar to those found in TRIPS.7
9 Lilly's argument was not about investment
protection proper, but about the compatibility of Canadian law with obligations
undertaken vis-a-vis other states (Mexico and the United States).
It is necessary to explain how Lilly managed to concoct this argument, as this
understanding will become relevant below.
80 Normally, a disagreement on the
application of intellectual property norms contained in the TRIPS Agreement or
NAFTA would be subject to state-to-state dispute settlement under the relevant
agreement.81 ISDS in this context is viewed as a way to achieve indirectly what a
corporation cannot do directly (because it cannot convince its host state to file a
WTO case).82 Lilly's argument hangs on a provision in NAFTA that seems to
exclude precisely this type of situation from the purview of investor-state disputes.
76. Valentina S. Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Il ealth and
Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U.J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 113, 181 (2015).
77. Id. at 181-82.
78. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶ 377.
79. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Expert Report of Daniel J. Gervais, supra note 60, at 18-20
(comparing Chapter Seventeen of NAFTA to TRIPS); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 27,
arts. 27-34.
80. See infra Part IV.
81. For NAFTA, this is provided under chapter 20, and especially article 2004, which provides
in part that "[t]he dispute settlement provisions of this Chapter shall apply with respect to the avoidance
or settlement of all disputes between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of this
Agreement." See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property
Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 799-800 (1997). The
TRIPS Agreement provides that disputes between WTO Members shall be settled under "[t]he
provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 27, art 64.1; see also Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; DANIEL
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HiSTORY AND ANALySIS 669-75 (4th ed. 2012).
82. See Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment
Treaties to Seek Relieffor Breaches of WITO Law, 6J. INT'L ECON. L. 493, 503-06 (2003). It is true that
there have been few TRIPS disputes and that many did not provide relief for the corporations that had
requested that the cases be brought. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Did Not Bite: 15
Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT'L DISP. MGMT. 389, 393, 395 (2010).
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That provision is Article 1110(7), which reads as follows:
This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses
granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation,
limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such
issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter
Seventeen (Intellectual Property).
Lilly's argument in this respect was that it had "demonstrated that Canada's
measures were cognizable expropriations because they violated Canada's
obligations in Chapter 17 of NAFTA (a basis for liability that Article 1110(7)
contemplates)."84 Basically, the argument rests on the fact that, if the investor can
demonstrate that the revocation (or other measure) mentioned in article 1110(7)
was not "consistent with Chapter Seventeen," then it was fair game under Chapter
11 (ISDS).
Canada disagreed. It noted in its rejoinder that:
The inference that Claimant is asking the Tribunal to draw is a logical
fallacy, known as the fallacy of denying the antecedent. In essence, the
problem with the reasoning is that it ignores the other reasons why
something may or may not have occurred. The most classic example
involves the following syllogism: "If it is raining, then the streets are
wet." . . . Applied to this case, the relevant conditional statement would be:
"If a measure is consistent with Chapter 17, then it is consistent with
Article 1110." From this, one cannot infer, as Claimant suggests, that
because a measure is inconsistent with Chapter 17, it is inconsistent with
Article 1110. There could be many other reasons why the measure is
consistent with Article 1110. Claimant's interpretation perverts the logic of
Article 1110(7) by transforming what was intended to be a shield for the
NAFTA Parties in a sensitive area into a sword for disappointed patent
litigants to wield.85
Mexico and the United States agreed. The US 1128 submission argues that:
Article 1110(7) therefore should not be read as an element of an
investor's claim under Article 1110(1) or as a jurisdictional hook that allows
a Chapter Eleven tribunal to examine whether alleged breaches of Chapter
Seventeen by a NAFTA Party constitute an expropriation of intellectual
property rights. Nor should Article 1110(7) be read as an invitation to
83. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(7) (emphasis added).
84. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant's Reply Memorial, at
109 (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4384.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9VG-Q2JS [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Claimant's Reply Memorial].
85. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Respondent's Rejoinder on the
Merits, at 99 (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ITA/`
20LAW%207014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6R5-BVW2] [hereinafter Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada,
Respondent's Rejoinder on the Merits].
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review a NAFTA Party's measures, each time they arise, for consistency
with Chapter Seventeen.86
Can an investment tribunal disregard the fact that all parties to the "contract"
called NAFTA agree on its meaning? After all, it has been said that "states which
are bound by [a treaty] at the relevant time, own the treaty," which is consonant
with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, because the parties' understanding both
illuminates the "object and purpose" of the treaty and may provide evidence of the
subsequent practice of the parties.87 True, it has also been argued that tribunals
should ignore the parties' views when the text is clear, also on the basis of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), assuming of course that the
meaning is clear and unambiguous from the text itself. 88
The answer is that an ISDS tribunal is not formally bound by those
submissions, but it should think hard and long before ignoring them.
89 Indeed the
Tribunal did pay great heed to the American and Mexican submissions.
90 If the
parties provide convincing evidence of their intention at the time of entering into the
treaty, then that should have significant force because, using Vienna Convention
(Article 31(1)) terminology, it provides powerful evidence of the object and purpose
of the agreement. Evidence of uniform subsequent practice should also matter, and
in practice it often has, in an arbitral context.91 This method of determining object
and purpose and subsequent practice matters because even though Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention allows use of "preparatory work of the treaty and the
86. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Submission of the United States of America, supra note 67, at 16
(footnotes omitted); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, NAFTA Article 1128
Submission of United Mexican States, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw7l74.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3WT-TAKN] ("[B]ecause of the particular
role of the adjudicative power within the organization of states, Mexico agrees with Canada that, with
respect to judicial acts, denial of justice is the only rule of customary international law clearly identified
and established so far as part of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens .... ).
87. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT] (providing that a treaty "shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its purpose"); see United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Interpretation ofllAs:
What States Can Do, 11A Issues Note, No. 3, at 3, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2011/10 (Jan. 11,
2012); James Crawford, A Consensualist Interpretation oflArticle 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, in TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 29, 31 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013).
88. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 296 (1988) ("The cornerstone of the Vienna Convention is its
requirement that courts refrain from inquiring into the parties' actual intentions if the provision to be
interpreted is clear on its face.").
89. See Margie-Lys Jaime, Note, Relying upon Parties'Interpretation i  Treaty-Based Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements, 46 GEo. J. INT'L L. 261, 293
(2014).
90. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶ 158.
91. See Iran v. United States, Case No. BT (Counterclaim), Interlocutory Award, Award
No. ITL 83-B1-FT (September 9, 2004) ("[F]ar from playing a secondary role in the interpretation of




circumstances of its conclusion" as supplementary means of interpretation,92 an
empirical analysis has shown that arbitral tribunals rarely if ever have recourse to
such supplementary means, especially the travaux (the preparatory work for a treaty,
including conference records and draft texts).93
D. Lilly's Change of Approach
In its memorial, Lilly argued that, as "Robert Armitage, Lilly's former General
Counsel, explains, the utility requirement is 'substantially harmonized across
jurisdictions."'94 The Author's initial report demonstrated in no uncertain terms that
the harmonization argument was a red herring.95 Every effort to agree on a
definition of utility pre- and post-NAFTA, including in the patent law treaty
discussions, failed to produce consensus.96
In its reply memorial to Canada's defense, Lilly changed its approach. It
abandoned the harmonization argument, even denying, despite having made it very
openly as can be seen above from the mouth of its own General Counsel, that it
had never claimed there had been substantive harmonization of patent law.97 One
of Lilly's experts hired in support of its reply-a former WIPO patent official-
argued instead that "the industrial applicability (utility) standard is, as further
discussed below, applied in a manner that is remarkably similar around the world."98
He further noted that his "experience has also taught [him] that there are equally
important areas where the practices of member states are consistent. I disagree with
Professor Gervais's attempt to place industrial applicability (utility) in the first
category (of divergence) rather than the second category (of consistengy)."99
The Author's second report, in reply to Lilly's expert, quoted, inter alia, a
report prepared by WIPO, indeed by the very division of which their WIPO expert
was director when the report was produced.1oo This WIPO document noted the
following:
92. VCLT, supra note 87, art. 32.
93. See Baiju S. Vassani & Anastasiya Ugale, Travaux Preparatoires and the Legitimacy of Investor-
State Arbitration, 11 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2014).
94. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 57, at 132.
95. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Expert Report of Daniel J. Gervais, supra note 60, at 7-12.
96. See id.
97. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Claimant's Reply Memorial, supra note 84, at 5.
98. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of Philip Thomas,
at 4 (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4375.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LZU-NKWE].
99. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
100. Their expert noted the following in his report:
In 1990, I joined the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") as a Senior Legal
Officer. Over the next 20 years, I served in a range of senior positions, including as Director
of the PCT Legal Development Division and Director of the Patent Policy Department. I
retired in 2010 as Senior Director-Advisor (PCT and Patents).
Id. at 2. In his testimony (the Author was present at the hearing), he confirmed that the report was
produced by his division while he worked there.
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Information received by [WIPO] members, reveals that there is a wide
range of differences among SCP members concerning the interpretation and practice
relating to the 'industrial applicability/utility' requirement. It also shows that
the industrial applicability/utility requirement is closely linked, or
sometimes overlaps, with other substantive patentability requirements,
such as the sufficient disclosure (enablement) requirement, inventive step,
exclusions from patentable subject matter and the definition of
'invention'.101
This Article lets the reader decide. Unfortunately, the Tribunal neither
discussed, nor opined on, the matter of harmonization.
E. Regulatory Flexibility
A significant disagreement between the parties in the Lilly case concerned the
flexibility to implement international obligations. Lilly's argument tugged directly
on "the tension between the private interests of foreign investors and the regulatory
autonomy of the host state."102 Indeed the issue of regulatory flexibility is one of
the major issues in the ISDS context. This was not a case of actual or direct
expropriation; instead, the notion of indirect expropriation was used to challenge the
judicial application of a patent doctrine to specific inventions, thus arguably
amounting to a challenge by a private non-state actor to Canada's sovereign ability
to regulate its substantive patent law and evolve its patent law through court
interpretations. As noted above, investors want to limit regulatory flexibility and
ISDS can provide them with a powerful tool to do so. At bottom, this becomes an
argument about state sovereignty. Canada's reply memorial noted the following in
this respect:
[A]s Claimant itself acknowledges, the NAFTA Parties have flexibility
in deciding how to implement the obligations of NAFTA Chapter
Seventeen. Accordingly, even if NAFTA Article 1709(1) required the
NAFTA Parties to impose the specific "low threshold" utility standard
Claimant alleges (it does not), it has nothing to say about how the NAFTA
Parties are permitted to implement the requirement, particularly with
regard to issues of evidence and disclosure.
103
Parties to a treaty can agree to definitions that must then be applied in the
event of a dispute according to the Vienna Convention rules, but there is no
definition of "utility" in either NAFTA or TRIPS. Hence, Canada was correct to
argue that NAFTA left to each party "the flexibility to define and implement the
specific legal standard under each of the enumerated criteria of novelty, non-
obviousness or inventiveness, and utility or industrial applicability. It does not adopt
101. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF INDUSTRIAL
APPLICABILITY/ UTILITY REQUIREMENTS UNDER NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAWS (2001), quoted in
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Second Report of Dr. Daniel Gervais, supra note 75, at 15 (emphasis added).
102. Vadi, supra note 76, at 119.




any one particular meaning for any of the terms."104 Canada's argument followed
the Vienna Convention because the VCLT considers: (1) the ordinary meaning of
the terms "useful" and "capable of industrial application" as understood in the
patent law field in the NAFTA parties; (2) the context of Article 1709(1); (3) the
subsequent practice of the NAFTA parties; (4) other relevant rules of international
law; and (5) to the extent necessary to eliminate ambiguity, any relevant
supplemental means of interpretation.105 Canada argued that none of these points
supports Lilly's argument that a single or baseline notion circumscribing the
meaning of utility or other patentability criteria (including those not named in
NAFTA, such as enablement) bound the NAFTA parties or their domestic courts.
The Tribunal agreed with Canada that ISDS tribunals were not courts of appeal of
domestic courts, but noted that courts are organs of the state and that egregious
errors by a court could be subject to an ISDS proceeding, thus refusing a categorical
exclusion.106
In the end, all of Lilly's claims were rejected, but the case remains relevant.
First, much of the outcome relied on Lilly's inability to provide evidence to support
its case107 because the tribunal had no difficulty accepting that patents at issue were
investments.108 It also accepted that acts of courts as judicial organs of a state would
be scrutinized by an ISDS tribunal-especially those that might "crystallize" an
expropriation-but only if there was "clear evidence of egregious and shocking
conduct" by the court.109 This means that future ISDS claims could be filed on the
basis of patent invalidations. The panel also left open the possibility that a sudden
change in the law might have led to a different outcome by referring to the
progressive nature of the change in Canadian law-some degree of change through
judicial interpretation is to be expected, particularly in a common law
environment.110
III. INTERFACES BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT
The tide of this Part could easily be the tide of a book. Needless to say, not
every nook and cranny of the substantive interfaces between intellectual property,
human rights and international trade can be explored in these pages. It gets worse:
add the investment dimension and one must now square new normative and
104. Id. at 65.
105. VCLT, supra note 87, arts. 31-32; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Respondent's Rejoinder on
the Merits, supra note 85, at 66.
106. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶ 221 ("[A] NAFTA Chapter
Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier in respect of the decisions of national judiciaries."); see also supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
107. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶¶ 308, 349, 366, 376, 379, 385.
108. See id. ¶ 167 (referring to "the investments at issue in this arbitration (the Zyprexa and
Strattera Patents)").
109. See id. ¶¶ 221, 224.
110. See id. ¶f 198, 310, 349.
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doctrinal circles. The purpose of this Part is thus only to provide the necessary
context on the elements of the interface to allow this Article to make concrete
doctrinal recommendations in Part V.
This Part explores the linkages between intellectual property protection in
trade and investment agreements, on the one hand, and access to (at least certain)
pharmaceuticals and human rights, on the other. When applied to pharmaceutical
regulation the international regime in which interfaces must be built is
"characterized by institutional density and governed by human rights law,
international intellectual property law and international health law.""
A. Intellectual Propery and Human Rights
The UN Charter, the texts establishing some UN specialized agencies (such as
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and international human rights law more
generally commit member states to the protection and promotion of human
rights.112 Some core human rights are even consideredjus cogens, creating obligations
from which treaties cannot derogate.113 Neither intellectual property (discussed in
this Section) nor the right to health (discussed in Section III.C.) are typically
considered to form part of jus cogens.14
Some forms of intellectual property may be seen as (non-jus cogens) human
rights when such intellectual property rights are aligned with and fulfill human
rights' objectives. This means that investors can, and do, rely on property
protections or other fundamental rights in investment disputes. Infusing human
rights into such disputes is this far from a one-way street."
5 A first example is the
right of authors in their creations while acknowledging the need for access, as
required by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."
6
At least part of the copyright system can be defended as a human right, for two
111. Vadi, supra note 76, at 123.
112. Petersmann, supra note 20, at 32.
113. Id. at 33.
114. See Patricia C. Gunn, Health Care Refugees, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 339, 361 (2009).
115. See Jose A. Alvarez, The Use (and Misuse) ofEuropean Human Rights Law in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, in THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
519, 605 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2017) (discussing the protection of investment as property or a possession
under European human rights law).
116. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art 15, Dec. 16, 1966,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 | hereinafter ICESCR] (providing both
the right of everyone to take part in cultural life and to benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author). As of 2016, the Covenant has 164 parties. The United States has signed, but has not ratified
the Covenant. See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH




reasons. First, because it is seen as property, and property is sometimes seen as a
human right.117 Second, as Rene Cassin (Nobel Peace Prize recipient (1968) and co-
drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)) noted, human
beings "can claim rights by the fact of their creation."118 The Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union also considers intellectual property as
a fundamental right.119
Human rights principles and analogies provide normative boundaries to the
age-old quest for intrinsic equilibrium in copyright policy: the protection of interests
resulting from expressed creativity, on the one hand, and the right to enjoy and
share the arts and scientific advancements, on the other. Indeed, Article 27 of the
UDHR is an interesting normative tool to balance copyright policy. It offers a solid
justificatory theory beyond the practicalities of trade: Article 27 UDHR protects
both the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
and scientific, literary or artistic production of which an individual is the author and
users' right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the
arts, and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.120 Copyright protection
can thus serve to protect interests resulting from scientific, literary, or artistic
production, while securing the objective of access, which is expressed teleologically
as a tool to allow everyone to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement
and its benefits. By giving a purpose to exceptions, human rights may both serve as
guidance to courts and compensate for the excessively economic focus of trade
law.121
Professor Frangois Dessemontet summarized this rather well when he wrote
that "the Universal Declaration and the UN Covenant [on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights adopted on 16 December, 1966] mark the apex of the French vision
of literary and artistic property, as opposed to the Anglo-American 'mercantilist'
117. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17(l), 2012
O.J. (C326/391). There are questions as to whether that human right protection of property extends to
private property. See Daniel Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible
Traditional Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 467, 483-484 (2003).
118. Michel Vivant, Autbors' Rghts, 14uman Rights?, 174 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR [RIDA] 60, 86 (1997).
119. E.U. Charter art. 17(2) ("Intellectual property shall be protected."). For a discussion, see
Christophe Geiger, IntellectualProperty Shall Be Protected!?Article 17 (2) ofthe Charter of.Fundamental Rights of
the Eurvpean Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope, 31 EUR. INT'L PROP. REV. 113, 113-16
(2009) ("On December 7, 2000, intellectual property (IP) entered the 'Pantheon' of European
fundamental rights protection.... [T]his provision (or at least the way it seems to be understood) could
contribute to amplifying the crisis of legitimacy that IP is currently facing in public opinion. For sure,
IP would have been better off without this badly-drafted provision.").
120. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 27, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
For a discussion, see Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 121.
121. For example, French courts have done so on occasion. See B. Edelman, Bulletin, Proprilti
Intellectuelle, 4 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONALE [J.D.I.] 1005 (1989); Pierre Sirinelli, Note, 143
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT AUTEUR [R.I.D.A] 301 (1989) (Fr.); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward
Supranational Copyright Law? The WITO Panel Decision and the 'Three Step Test" for Copyright
Exemptions, 187 R.I.D.A. 3, 51-56 (2001) (Fr.).
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view as ensconced in the TRIPS."1 22 Put differently, the trade-economic approach
refocused copyright on the industries that produce and distribute copyrighted
content. From a purely policy-oriented perspective, this 'de-centering' of copyright
away from creators reduces the moral imperative of users, whose sympathy for large
distribution multinationals (assuming for the sake of this discussion that this is a
widespread perception of how the music and film industry are structured) is far
from infinite.
The Lilly case was about patents, not copyrights, however, which leads to
major normative differences from the copyright analysis above, as this Article will
now attempt to demonstrate.
B. Patents and Human Rights
Like copyright, patents are rights to prohibit the use of protected material
(works in the case of copyright; inventions in the case of patents). If seen as a form
of property, they may benefit from fundamental or human right to the protection
of private property. This is so even in the absence of a viable market. To that extent,
they are, like other property rights, rights to exclude. Yet, as noted in the previous
pages, denial of access to copyrighted material may negatively affect the human
rights balance between creation and access to culture and information. Denial of
patented pharmaceuticals to patients who cannot afford them, however, when they,
or their government, could afford those products at a generic rate (that is, without
patent rent) may be an affront to another human right, namely the right to heath.
123
The Preamble to the World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution provides that
the "enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion,
political belief, economic or social condition."
124
Battles between pharmaceutical companies, on the one hand, and AIDS and
public health activists advocating flexibility on behalf of developing countries, on
the other hand, have left scars on pharmaceutical companies, notably in the form
of negative impressions on public opinion.
125 Fighting public health interests
perceived and presented as human rights and spokespersons uch as Midecins sans
122. Frangois Dessemontet, Copyjrght and Human Rghts, inlNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION LAW 113, 114 (Jan J.C. Kabel ed., 1998).
123. See infra Section C.
124. Constitution of the World Health Organization, PreambleJuly 22,1946, 62 Stat. 2679,14
U.N.T.S. 185. A number of proposals have been made at the World Health Organization (WHO) not
only to limit patent protection but to "delink" drug prices from the underlying R&D costs. See WORLD
HEALTH ORG., AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS 18 (2016)
("Consultations with WHO Member states highlighted that any new funding mechanism should take
into account the main principles for equitable R&D ... |including] open knowledge innovation and
delinkage of R&D costs from product price in order to ensure equitable access.").
125. See Martin L. Hirsch, Side Effects of Corporate Greed: Pharmaceutical Companies Need a Dose
of Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 607, 632 (2008) (observing that "PhrMA
may be forced to consider the negative impact that opposing human rights and consumer protection
laws will have on public opinion of drug companies.").
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Frontfires (Doctors Without Borders) and Nelson Mandela, against a backdrop of
dying children to defend a "trade-related" right was a difficult public relations battle,
one that should never have been waged. Moreover, an ethical, human rights
approach to public health dictates limits on patent rights, especially when no real
market benefit is possible because patients are too poor to afford the medication.
To put it differently, no one is forcing patent holders to produce at or below cost,
but patents may prevent third parties from producing lower cost versions and thus
prevent availability. At its most basic level, the human rights balance argument is
thus as follows: when the patent holder cannot reasonably hope to have a significant
market in a territory for a product that has life-saving potential, there is no legitimate
reason to prevent access to that product if someone (a public or private entity) is
willing to produce it at a cost that the country can afford. There are legitimate
concerns on the part of patent holders about re-exportation, and those should be
adequately addressed, as they have been at the WTO.126
The problem of HIV infection and other severe diseases affecting the least-
developed countries does not lie entirely with patents, far from it. In several African
countries where patent protection would be available, antiretroviral drugs are not
patented.127 Many others have until 2016 to adopt pharmaceutical patent protection
under WTO rules.128 Problems often lay elsewhere, such as in the absence of a
capacity of production and the lack of distribution networks. The latter can be
solved, though with colossal efforts, by setting up distribution mechanisms, local
clinics, etc. Concerns about interrupted treatments and the possible emergence of
more aggressive viruses must be taken very seriously.
The ripple effects of the clash between patents and human rights are far from
over. The WHO, for example, has actively entered the field and broadened the
discussion to the entire financing of pharmaceutical research, questioning whether
current models are optimal to generate "research into communicable diseases and
poverty and inequity in health."1 29 The WHO is not alone. The United Nations has
generally taken a dim view of the interface between trade and human rights,
especially when ISDS is factored in. A report presented in 2015 to the UN General
Assembly concluded that ISDS "should be abolished as a fundamentally flawed
126. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, T 6, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 1LM 746 (2002) (commenting on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health); Marla L. Mellino, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed Countries'Access
to Essential Pharmaceuticals?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1349, 1388 (2010).
127. See Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents forAntiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access
to Aids Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1887 (2001) ("This study demonstrates that patent
protection for antiretroviral drugs in Africa is not extensive.").
128. Some commentators believe that this flexibility is "merely academic" because many sub-
Saharan countries comply with TRIPS even if they are under no obligation to do so. See Poku Adusei,
The Right to Health and Constitutional Imperatives for Regulating the Exercise of Pharmaceutical Patent
Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 AFR.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 250, 262 (2013).
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system having adverse human rights impacts."1
30 Ten years earlier, the High
Commissioner for Human Rights offered a less radical solution, based in part on
the above-mentioned references to "public morals" in GATT and GATS.131 The
report quotes Robert Howse, who suggested that:
In the modern world, the very idea of public morality has become
inseparable from the concern for human personhood, dignity, and capacity
reflected in fundamental rights. A conception of public morals or morality
that excluded notions of fundamental rights would simply be contrary to
the ordinary contemporary meaning of the concept.1
32
On that basis, the report argued, "the exclusion of the norms and standards
of international human rights on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms
would be very difficult to sustain."133 As to the meaning of "human life or health",
the report takes the view that "according to its ordinary meaning, is also very broad
and has considerable potential to include a number of human rights. Certainly, the
right to life and right to health fall within its scope."
134
C. The "Right to Health" in Context
In what is perhaps its clearest articulation, the right to health appears in Article
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which recognizes "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health."
135 According to General
Comment 14, this right to health requires access to at least certain medicines.
136 The
right also rests on Article 25.1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
130. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic
and Equitable International Order, U.N. Doc. A/70/285 (Aug. 5, 2015).
131. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights and World
Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/05/
5 (2005), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WTOen.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W3G-
EK79] [hereinafter OHCHR Report].
132. Robert Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but Not Quite Yet: India's
Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European Union's Generalized System
of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1333, 1368 (2003).
133. OHCHR Report, supra note 131, at 5.
134. Id.
135. ICESCR, supra note 116, art. 12.
136. United Nations Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14 (2000):
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 17, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000),
http://undocs.org/E/C.12/2000/4 (including the provision of equal and timely access to "appropriate
treatment of prevalent diseases, illnesses, injuries and disabilities, preferably at community level; the
provision of essential drugs; and appropriate mental health treatment and care" as state obligations); see
also Helen Keller & Lena Grover, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and Their
Legitimacy, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 116, 132 (Helen Keller
& Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012).
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security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.137
The IP/pharmaceutical patent protection relation with this "right to health"
appears to dominate much of the discussions. Normatively, it is the hypotenuse of
the IP/ pharmaceutical/human right (to health) triangle mentioned in the opening
paragraph of this Part. It is not just about providing property-like rights to
pharmaceutical research companies. As Valentina Vadi notes, pharmaceutical
protection reflects both private and public interests, namely the private interest of
the patent owner (that is, exclusive rights for the term of the patent and possible
extensions), but also the public interest.138 The public interest is protected by access
to (new) life-saving or life-improving medicines, of course, and that is a fundamental
part of the bargain. But the public interest is also served by the possibility (afforded
by the patent disclosure) for other innovators to build on inventions disclosed to
develop their own, including in markets where no patent is in force and in which
there is thus no need to wait for the expiration of the patent.'39 Indeed, while there
are real debates about the net (in aggregate) positive impact of patents on innovation
writ large, empirical studies tend to isolate pharmaceuticals as an area in which they
produce positive outcomes.140
How does this nuanced grouping of private and public interests translate into
trade rules? Such rules can accommodate at least some of the triangular policy
equation outlined in the previous paragraphs, as the adoption of the Ministerial
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and the subsequent 2003 establishment
of the "paragraph 6 system" at the WTO illustrate.141 The issue that arises not in
trade, but in an ISDS context, however, is the singular focus on the protection of
private interests. This casts a deep shadow over the public interest component built
into the patent system, thus potentially creating a severe policy imbalance.142 Put
differently, in a state-to-state dispute settlement context, such as at the WTO
Dispute-Settlement Body (DSB), public policy arguments can and are regularly used
137. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 120.
138. Vadi, supra note 76, at 121.
139. Seeid. On the value of patent information, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information?, 25 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 545, 601 (2012) (noting that "the technical value of patent
disclosures is greater than many legal scholars have appreciated, but also that many patents probably
fail to meet the existing disclosure requirements."); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 661 (2010) (suggesting an improvement in patent documentation
because "[a] more technically robust patent document, replete with working examples, will allow follow-
on innovators to more easily and quickly create second-generation products and processes.").
140. Outside the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, James Bessen and Michael Meurer
"safely conclude that during the late 1990s, the aggregate cost of patents exceeded the aggregate private
benefits of patents for United States public firms." JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 141
(2008). The classic study might still be Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study,
32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 (1986).
141. See Baker & Geddes, supra note 49, at 28 n.127.
142. See Vadi, supra note 76, at 146.
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to justify (e.g., under general exceptions clauses in GATT or GATS) a prima facie
violation of a trade-related commitment contained in a WTO instrument.
143
Does the same reasoning apply to ISDS? Professor Sornarajah suggests that
conflicts between private and public interests are likely to be structurally prevalent
in ISDS due to panels' use of "low-order sources of international law like decisions
of tribunals and the writings of 'highly-qualified publicists' who are no more than
hired guns," thus not leaving states to address "issues involving economic
development, poverty, welfare needs [and] the environment."1
44 Kate Miles suggests
in the same vein that there is "little room for the consideration of the public interest
in a regime so heavily weighted towards investor protection."1
45 If patents are seen
as property, then their revocation, even where fully justified under domestic law,
may appear at first glance like an expropriation, absent the broader normative
context that typically informs patent and innovation policies.
Professor Susy Frankel notes in connection that:
Investment tribunal arbitrators when making decisions (including the
interpretation of the agreements at issue) are likely to focus on the function
of IP as a set of property rights rather than as equally important parts of
the international IP structure, which enables tailoring of those rights to
reward innovation appropriately (rather than excessively) and to maintain
regarding interests, such as when property rights need to be balanced with
affordability and availability of medicines .... [T]hat does not require and
should not result in detaching the property aspects of IP from its other
functions and objectives.1
46
True, "property" in the patent field does not mean quite the same thing as,
say, in real estate, even if all property rights arguably have a societal function.
47 For
example, property rights are sometimes described as absolute.
148 Intellectual
143. In the specific case of intellectual property, a WIG dispute-settlement panel discussing
TRIPS Article 8 noted the following: "This fundamental feature of intellectual property protection
inherently grants Members freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures
to attain those public policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not
require an exception under the TRIPS Agreement." Panel Report, European Communities-Protection
of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210, WTO
Doc. WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005).
144. See Muthu-Cumaraswamy Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution in International Investment
Arbitration? The Descent into Normlessness, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 631, 654-55 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
145. Kate Miles, Reconceptuali.Zing International Investment Lav: Bringing the Public Interest into
Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 295, 296
(Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010).
146. Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectual Property
Law, J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 5 (2016).
147. See Jakob Cornides, Human Rigbts and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Convergence?, 7
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 135, 143 (2004) ("|P]roperty is not an end in itself. Obviously, it must 
be used
in a way that contributes to the realization of the higher objectives of human society.").
148. See generally Robert P. Burns, Blackstone's Tbeory of the "Absolute" Rigbts of Property, 54
U. CIN. L. REV. 67, 72 (1985) ("Of all the absolute rights, the most essential are those of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property.").
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property by contrast has inherent limitations (e.g., term) and exceptions (e.g., fair
use) built into the system. They are "part of the framework of rights, rather than
being something that gnaws away at them."1 49 Those broader societal objectives
related to innovation and access provide "both boundaries and the framework of
the scope of the property rights."1o
5
Then the grant of a patent right has a specific purpose, and that purpose, seen
teleologically (from a policy perspective), is primarily an instrument to create an
incentive that will be in the (private) interest of the patent holder but for the greater
public interest in access to innovation.15' The public interest component present, to
a certain extent at least, in state-to-state dispute settlement is not the same when a
party to the dispute is a multinational company. As Susan Sell notes, despite all the
rhetoric of economic competitiveness, states are not firms.152 Firms "only have to
worry about one thing-shareholder value. The bottom line is always to earn a
profit, and they have one clear goal-to increase shareholder value. Policymakers
face a much more complicated array of issues and priorities."1 53 Yet, as noted above,
patent holders use human rights, such as private property protection in their
favor.154
Still, patent owners using ISDS to challenge regulatory measures adopted by
host states can directly impact regulatory autonomy, including the state's ability to
make and change innovation policies and to protect human rights.'55 Hence, the
risk is that allowing ISDS to interpret the scope of intellectual property obligations
as private property and well beyond issues of actual expropriation "stand to disrupt
regulations governing everything from public health, energy, finance, education,
privacy, and free expression. Under these provisions investors can attack domestic
social bargains and, if successful, override legitimate sovereign regulatory
discretion."156 As far as evolution of the law in court opinions are concerned, the
Tribunal in the Lilly case found that such evolutions were normal and that investors
should expect hem to happen.157
149. Frankel, supra note 146, at 14.
150. Id. at 16.
151. See Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How
Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law 12 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop. &
Competition Law, Research Paper No. 13-06, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=2228067 [https://perma.cc/MP2X-C9E] ("Society has a need for intellectual
productions in order to ensure its development and cultural, economic, technological and social
progress and therefore grants the creator a reward in the form of an intellectual property right, which
enables him to exploit his work and to draw benefits from it. In return, the creator, by rendering his
creation accessible to the public, enriches the community. Intellectual property law is thus the product
of a type of 'social contract' between the author and society.").
152. Susan K. Sell, Remarks, 8 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 317 (2014).
153. Id. at 318.
154. See supra Section III.A.
155. See Vadi, supra note 76, at 186.
156. Sell, supra note 152, at 317.
157. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶¶ 198, 310, 349.
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The potential conflict between ISDS and human rights exacerbates the risk
that tenuous bridges built to allow states to enforce human rights when those rights
conflict with trade commitments will collapse. The chink in the post-Westphalian
armor is that supranational mechanisms meant to cabin states to avoid bad actions
may be used to prevent them from performing good ones. Although this claim
could be made with respect to trade law-especially with the more powerful WTO
DSB (compared to its GATT predecessor)-direct conflicts have thus far been
reasonably well handled-often by avoidance.'
58 In the ISDS context, the question
that arises is, when such conflicts emerge, how will they be handled?
The arc of trade law is moving in a positive direction, towards at least conflict
avoidance and perhaps even some form of reconciliation. Professor Helfer has
offered a vision of interpenetration and cross-pollination of intellectual property
and human rights, possibly even a form. of integration.1
59 Will ISDS go in the
opposite direction? As Professor Okediji commented, this is a "stunning change"
as she noted that the ijly case represented "uncharted territory in the increasingly
complex and contested landscape of international intellectual property
obligations."160 In her view, national innovation policy is:
[O]ne of the very few areas still largely insulated from the pervasive
economic governance that conditions contemporary international
economic relations. Intellectual property obligations in the investment
context thus pose a new threat to states' traditional lawmaking powers by
providing foreign actors a singular opportunity to challenge laws that have
been enacted with the domestic public interest in full view.
161
Professors Dreyfuss and Frankel have noted (rightly in this Article's view),
along similar lines, that the TRIPS Agreements may contain upper limits to justify
limits on intellectual property in the public interest, such as those contained in
Articles 1.1, 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.
162 Those are for the most part absent
from NAFTA and many other IIAs.1
63
In sum, regulatory autonomy in the public health area is constrained by trade
law, but only to a limited extent because, as the next Part explicates, doctrinal
158. The GATT was weaker because a losing party could veto adoption of the report. Not so
under the WTO. See supra note 24.
159. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and. New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 71-78 (2004).
160. Okediji, supra note 56, at 1122.
161. Id.
162. Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International
Law is ReconceptualiZing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 557, 588 (2015) ("While the Basic
Principles of the TRIPS Agreement permit states to implement more extensive protection, there is a
proviso: they may not go so far as to 'contravene the provisions of the Agreement.' Now that it is clear
how easily theories of commodification and assetization can unravel the rationale behind IP
protections, the proviso could play a more prominent role in the future. The Objectives provision of
TRIPS recognizes that IP protection should be to the mutual advantage of producers and users, create
a balance of rights and obligations, and promote technical transfer. Thus, agreements that undermine
those objectives should not be regarded as legitimately made.").
163. The text of NAFTA chapter 17 contains no equivalent provision. NAFTA, supra note 1.
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interfaces exist to factor in the public interest and human rights in trade disputes.
In the ISDS context, that regulatory autonomy may be threatened due to the very
fuzzy interface with both human rights law and regulatory autonomy. Panels in
ISDS disputes can and often do consider human rights arguments put forward by a
party as they would any other argument brought to their attention. Is that a
sufficient guarantee? The answer is certainly not a clear yes.
Protecting human rights can be seen in this context as a subset of a broader
regulatory regime protecting social welfare and other key public policy objectives.164
The challenge is to integrate regulatory autonomy and the public interest that
underpins it into the ISDS equation, a task to which the last Part now turns its
attention. Before doing so, let us see which interfaces have been used in the area of
trade law and whether they can be ported to the ISDS context.
IV. DOCTRINAL INTERFACES
A. Balancing Human Rights, Trade and Investment
There is no recognized supremacy or hierarchy of human rights and trade and
investment rules-at least beyond jus cogens. General principles of interpretation
apply, however. Hence, one may argue that an IIA signed after the conclusion of an
instrument protecting human right may have priority under the lex posterior derogat
legi priori canon, or that an IIA should take precedence over more general human
rights obligations under the lex specialis derogat legi generali canon.165
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) uses the VCLT and "general
balancing principles (such as transparency, non-discrimination, necessity, and
proportionality) in deciding on whether national restrictions of freedom of trade are
necessary for the protection of public interests."'66 DSB reports often limit the
scope of their review of WTO Members' regulatory autonomy.167 This raises
directly the interface question: can a WTO Member use an obligation to comply
with its human rights obligations to derogate from a trade commitment, absent a
direct possibility to do so in the text containing the commitments?68 Professor
Pauwelyn, for example, has advocated allowing:
[T]he use of human rights as a defence against a claim of WTO violation
in WTO dispute settlement but only if (i) both disputing parties are bound
by the human rights provision in question, (ii) there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the WTO obligation, on the one hand, and the human
right, on the other, and (iii) pursuant to a conflict clause in either treaty or
164. See LONE WANDAIL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 9,223 (2016).
165. Petersmann, supra note 20, at 33. According to the lex posterior derogat (legi) priori canon,
a later law prevails over an earlier one. According to the lex specialis derogat legi generali canon, a more
specific law prevails over a general one.
166. Id at 34.
167. See id.
168. This possibility is explored in Part V.
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the applicable conflict rules of public international law (eg, lex posterior or
lex specialis), the human rights provision prevails over the WTO
provision.'69
The WTO Appellate Body has not articulated this interface quite that way.1
70
Professor Petersmann, opining on the dispute on Australian plan packaging
legislation, suggested a more flexible balancing:
Just as national courts tend to "balance" economic and health rights
on the basis of constitutional principles of non-discrimination, good faith,
necessity and proportionality of governmental restrictions, also regional
and WTO dispute settlement jurisdictions must interpret IEL "in
conformity with principles of justice" and "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" as accepted by all WTO members, notwithstanding the fact that
the differences among the applicable laws in different jurisdictions may
entail different procedures (e.g. regarding burden of proof, judicial
standards of review) and legitimately different interpretations of HRL,
constitutional laws, health law and IEL. The WTO panel [in the plain
packaging case] should therefore repeat and clarify in respect of the TRIPS
Agreement what the Appellate Body has already indicated with regard to
the TBT Agreement, i.e. that the legal and judicial "balancing methods" for
interpreting the specific WTO agreements should proceed from the same
"principles of justice" underlying WTO law as well as the human rights
obligations of WTO members.'
7 I
Other commentators balk at the thought of having human rights obligations
taken on board in trade tribunals, fearing a "take over" of human rights by trade
law.172
Like the WTO DSB, ISDS tribunals apply the VCLT. This suggests that the
arguments used to support the VCLT-based approach to human rights and
balancing tests used in trade may port to the investment area, if credible and useful
parallels can be established.173
B. Incorporating Human Rights in Trade and Investment Disputes
An option to operationalize the interface between human rights, on the one
hand, and international trade and investment law, on the other hand, is the
incorporation or integration of (specific) human rights in the trade or investment
169. Joost Pauwelyn, Human Rights in T/TO Dispute Settlement, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 20, at 205, 208.
170. Id. at 210.
171. Ernst-Ultich Petersmann, How to Reconcile Health Law and Economic Law with Human
Ri hts? Administration ofJustice in Tobacco Control Disputes, 10 ASIANJ. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 27, 60 (2015).
172. See Alston, supra note 3, at 837 (noting that the WTO is not "designed, structured, or
suitable to operate in the way that [an institution] with major human rights responsibilities would.").
173. See Jaime, supra note 89, at 287-88 ("[I]n the absence of express rules in a particular
IIA . . . it is appropriate to turn to the general rules of interpretation, as set forth by Articles 31-33
(Interpretation of Treaties) of the VCLT.").
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regime itself. Such an integrative approach can be pushed quite far, as one sees in
the work of Professor Petersmann, for example. He argued (in the case of trade)
that free trade forms part, or at least is aligned with, the international human rights
framework, in particular in advocating respect for human dignity, individual
autonomy, and the free development of one's personality through enterprise or
business.174 Free trade can help an "individual's right to trade the fruits of her labour
in exchange for foreign goods and services needed for personal self-development
in dignity." 175 Petersmann's view, anchored in Kant's idea that a constitutional law
doctrine of fundamental rights and duties of citizens could also apply
internationally,176 is that GATT and other international trade rules, typically viewed
as policy instruments designed to improve access to foreign markets, should also be
viewed as "domestic poliy instruments that could serve not only economic functions
(e.g., for promoting economic welfare), but also 'constitutional functions' (e.g., by
rendering domestic constitutional principles of freedom, non-discrimination, rule
of law, and judicial review more effective in the trade policy area)." 77 In his critique
of this approach Professor Alston notes that the subset of rules enshrined in
international trade law are not those that are "recognized as economic rights within
the framework of international human rights law."178
This debate can be neither resolved nor even fully investigated here. Whether
or not it is correct to assert that free trade meshes with the international human
rights framework, however, the idea that a "constitutional" approach advocating
not just a rapprochement between human rights and trade (possibly adding
investment), forms the basis for a doctrinal interface worthy of a bit more
exploration. Indeed, this might explain why the "currency [of this approach] has
persisted," in spite of harsh criticism both in academia and by developing
countries.179
How one defines constitutionalism is often infused with the view one takes of
the positive/natural law debate.180 In a model of liberal constitutionalism, "the
constitution establishes a set of electoral rules, and distributes capacities and
functions among governmental institutions."1 81 In a different model, such as the
174. Petersmann, supra note 20, at 31.
175. Id. at 26.
176. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the
1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR.J. INT'LL. 161, 165 (1995).
177. Petersmann, supra note 20.
178. Alston, supra note 3, at 822 (emphasis added).
179. See Deborah Z. Cass, The 'Constitutionaliation' ofInternational Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 EUR.J. INT'L L 39, 40
(2001) ("111ts currency has persisted even after it became apparent that the claim was considered
provocative not only by the trade law establishment, but also by developing countries and non-
governmental organizations with interests ranging from business regulation through environmental
standards, to labour reform.").
180. What I mean here, in very succinct fashion, is that a constitution is a highest norm in
Kelsen's theory but there are higher organic norms in a natural law approach.
181. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE 20 (2000).
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United States, a constitution adds "a layer of substantive constraints on the uses of
public authority."182 This typically limits what (each level of) government can do,
either by granting exclusive power over a certain area to one level of government
(thereby excluding others) or by imposing a set of "higher" rules and principles
(such as those contained in the US Bill of Rights or the EU Charter). Typically,
governments cannot (easily) derogate from such rules and principles-
acknowledging at the same time that enforcement is key. Consequently, the
existence of words describing such rights in a constitutional text does not always
mean that they will be applied to preserve the liberties of individual citizens.
183
A constitutional approach allows one to link higher-level norms at the
domestic level and international norms, such as customary international law. For
example, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
notes that "there is a willingness to conclude that prohibitions [against human rights
violations] common to the constitutions or laws of many states are general
principles that have been absorbed into international law."
184 As used in the context
of international trade, "constitutionalizing" might thus be translated as promoting
"an increasing 'internationalization' of formerly domestic constitutional law
concepts (like non-discrimination, necessity, and proportionality of government
restrictions on transnational trade)."85 Used in this sense "constitutionalization" of
trade law is an approach that can add normative depth to treaty interpretation, in
part because it can broaden the range of interpretive tools.
How would such an approach work in an ISDS context? The answer is far
from clear. Investor-state is not about free trade; it is about investment and
"property" protection.'86 In Lilly, the indirect expropriation argument applied to a
very specific type of "property," however, Lilly's complaint challenges the criteria
used by domestic courts, after due process, to decide that two patents were
invalid. 87 To argue that invalidation is a violation of the patent owner's human
rights (protection of property) is a huge step, one that this Article refuses to take.
This explains why a constitutional approach seems risky in an ISDS context.
Alston's critique of a possible normative and institutional takeover of human rights
by trade law and trade tribunals resonates louder here than in trade, even if at least
some aspects and normative underpinnings of international trade law are aligned
with a number of economic and developmental human rights.'
88 In an ISDS
182. Id. at 21 ("Guatemala, Iran, the Soviet Union and various authoritarian regimes elsewhere
have had wonderfully worded bills of rights that produced no discernible increase in respect for
individual liberties in those countries.").
183. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/391; John
S. Baker,jr., The Effectiveness of Bills of Rights, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1992).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (
701, Reporters' Notes 1, at 154 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
185. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of
International Markets, 37 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 407, 437 (2003).
186. See Alvarez, supra note 115.
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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context, by contrast, if a clash between investment protection and human rights
emerges, the "supreme" value of investor and property protection may be a poor
sextant to arbitrate the place of human rights if the normative lodestar is the rights
of multinational investors. In sum, although private property protection is
consistent with human rights, it is one of many such rights that should be considered
in that context.189
C Contractarian Approaches
Contract-based approaches have been suggested to broaden the scope and
nature of norms that international trade tribunals can use to interpret trade
agreements. This seems particularly relevant in an ISDS context because a
significant part of the IIAs, namely the BIT regime, "was developed on the basis of
a contractual way of thinking, lifting contractual claims out of a domestic context and
into an international law context."190 Put differently, ISDS is perhaps best seen as
private law while trade law as public law.
1. Filling Normative Lacunae
Any court interpreting a legal text, whether a contract, statute or treaty, may
be called upon not just to interpret it, but also to fill lacunae.191 Lacunae may be
said to exist for several reasons, including that terms are left undefined; that
definitions they contain are unclear; or that there are missing elements and
interstices in the texts. In the case of a treaty specifically, this includes taking
account of relevant rules of international law, as provided in the VCLT.1 92
Depending on the issue, international law can both provide context and constitute
"relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties."193
As was done for constitutional approaches, let us see first how this applies in
the trade law context. Non-WTO international agreements may provide context to
interpret the provisions of WTO agreements, as the WTO Appellate Body did in
the Shrimp-Turtle case.194 Using external norms as interpretive tools can be done
189. See Alvarez, supra note 115.
190. MOUYAL, supra note 164, at 223. The book only briefly mentions public health, see id. at
217-18, and NAFTA, see id at 68-73, but constitutes a most helpful study of the general interface
between human rights and investment law, including a detailed list of extant BITs and model BITs. See
id. at 223.
191. A lacuna in a specific treaty does not mean a lacuna in international law, in the sense that
international law beyond the text of the treaty can "fill" the lacuna. See Prosper Weil, 'The Court Cannot
Conclude Definitively . . ." Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUM.J. TRANSN'L L. 109, 110 (1997).
192. This often amounts to "interpreting silence" to quote the term used by Lone Wandahl
Mouyal in this context. MoUYAL, supra note 164, at 54.
193. VCLT, supra note 87, arts. 31(1), 31(3)(c).
194. Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, T| 127-131 (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
2018] 493
UC IRV7INE LAW RE/EW [4
without making law, which panels and the Appellate Body are prohibited from
doing under the DSU.' 9 5
As the International Law Commission suggests, international law can
"supplement" WTO law, unless the opposite is explicitly stated in the agreement.'
96
Along similar lines, in its 2008 resolution No. 5/2008 on International Trade Law
the International Law Association declared that "WTO members and bodies are
legally required to interpret and apply WTO rules in conformity with the human
rights obligations of WTO members under international law."1
97 Then, as was
pointed out by the International Court of Justice (ICJ):
It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the relevant
law in the given circumstance of the case, the burden of establishing or
proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the
parties for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.'9 8
It is often noted in this regard that the Appellate Body has said that WTO
norms are not to be read in "clinical isolation" from international law.1
99 The WTO
is not part of the United Nations and, although its former Director General
Supachai Panitchpakdi "affirmed the vital importance" of the UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), including the goal to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other diseases, those goals were not formally incorporated into the WTO
framework.200 The closest reference one can point to might be that contained in the
195. DSU Article 3(2) provides:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 81, art. 3(2); see also Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the
Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1149, 1206 (2013).
196. See Martti Koskennieni (Chairman of the Int'l Law Comm'n), Fragmentation of
International Law: Difjiculties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 85,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
197. Int'l Law Ass'n Res. No. 5/2008 (Aug. 17-21, 2008). Under its Constitution, the
International Law Association (ILA) is an international non-governmental organisation and has
consultative status. Its objectives are "the study, clarification and development of international law,
both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international
law." Int'l Law Ass'n Constitution art. 111, 5 1.
198. Fisheries jurisdiction (Get. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 181 (July 25).
199. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, ¶ 1II:B, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/ AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996); see also Appellate Body Report,
japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 12 n.19, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996).
200. Worlfgang Benedek, The World Trade OrganiZation and Human Rights, in ECONOMIC
GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 137, 150-51 (Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter & Fabrizio
Marrella eds., 2007). The WTO website, however, notes that the "WTO, in co-operation with
UNCTAD and ITC, monitors the achievement of trade-related Millennium Development Goals." See
The WTO and the Sustainable Development Goals, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
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TRIPS Declaration on Public Health, adopted in 2001, approximately one year after
the Millennium Summit in September 2000 at which the MDGs were adopted.201
At least two contract-based theories have been offered to suggest how trade
tribunals should use the VCLT. Some suggestions are infused with normative
objectives, such as Professor Harris suggestion that the WTO Appellate Body "may
nevertheless take the Agreement's unfairness into account by using the treaty of
adhesion doctrine to interpret its provisions more favorably to developing
countries."202 The WTO has a number of special and differential provisions
(including in the DSU) and it is unlikely that such a normative overlay will be applied
in the context of a dispute absent support in a negotiated text, whether that be a
WTO-negotiated agreement or a ministerial or decision.203 The second is the
doctrine of incomplete contracts, on which we now turn the spotlight.
2. Incomplete Contracts
In the wake of Hadfield's suggested application of the incomplete contracts
theory to statutes,204 Joel Trachtman suggested that WTO panels and the Appellate
Body could do the same to treaties, though not without significant constraints and
difficulties.205 He pointed to the role of adjudication bodies, especially when
interpreting standards instead of rules. A standard is not a lacuna; it needs to be
interpreted and applied to a specific fact pattern, however. As Trachtman explained,
"[1]acunae are circumstances where there is no law and no constraint. This is quite
different from a standard, where there is law applicable by a dispute resolution
tribunal but less explicit guidance to the tribunal as to how to decide."206
Now let us see how this might apply in an ISDS context. As already noted,
arbitral tribunals operating in an ISDS context follow the VCLT in interpreting
english/thewtoe/coher-e/mdg e/mdge.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3CV-WGD4] (last visited June
21, 2018).
201. Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/ninole/
mindeclbtrips-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV5H-SFL6]. On the Millennium Development Goals, see
generally UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2015 (2015).
202. Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27
U. PENN.J. INT'L ECON. L. 681, 687 (2006).
203. See Mary Sabina Peters & Manu Kumar, Annotation, Introspect "Special and Differential
Treatment" Given to Developing Countries Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 17 A.L.R. Int'l 123,
124 (2014) ("[T]he DSU included some provisions that referred to developing countries' special needs.
However, these Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) measures have turned out to be of very
limited value to developing countries ... Most of the clauses in DSU regarding developing countries
have turned out to be declarative rather than operative.").
204. Gillian K. Hadfield, Wezghing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision
in the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 547 (1994).
205. Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 350
(1999).
206. Id. at 376.
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investment treaties (or investment chapters of trade agreements).
207 The Lill Award
makes a very interesting series of points in that regard:
[Tihe phrase "applicable rules of international law" addresses not
simply, for example, rules of interpretation of treaties, such as those
reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("VCLT"), but also any other applicable rules of international law
that may be relevant to the case before it. . . . It will be a matter for each
tribunal constituted under Section B of NAFTA Chapter Eleven to
evaluate, with the assistance of submissions of the parties on the matter,
the precise scope of the phrase "applicable rules of international law" in
the circumstances of the case of which it is seised.
208
The VCLT directs tribunals to consider the plain meaning of the text. Yet, as
the arbitral tribunal pointed out in Saluka v. CZech Republic, the VCLT's direction
about object and purpose is also key in interpreting the scope of obligations, and it
includes both an immediate and a broader context.
209 Because they do follow the
VCLT, ISDS panels thus consider the plain meaning of the text in kight of its object
and purpose, and the subsequent practice of the parties in its application.
210
True, it may be difficult to argue before an ISDS tribunal that it must consider
human rights texts because an investment treaty (or the investment chapter of a
trade treaty like NAFTA) is "incomplete." Yet, the conflict between the object and
purpose of the investment chapter (to protect property) and the object and purpose of
the IP chapter of an IIA (forming part of a balanced and effective innovation policy)
must be reconciled. Petersmann suggests a balancing test similar to his proposal in
the WTO context:
Investment arbitral tribunals should likewise aim at reconciling the
general principles of law underlying the almost 3,000 investment treaties
with the governmental duties to protect public health not only on the basis
of the specific treaty commitments, but also with due regard to the
progressive judicial clarification of their underlying "principles of justice"
acknowledging sovereign rights to give priority to existential public health
values over utilitarian justifications of trade and investment law.
211
207. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
208. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶ 106; see also RUDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IAW 28 (2012).
209. Saluka v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, at 66-67 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP4U-
JRQ8] ("The 'fair and equitable treatment' standard in Article 3.1 of the Treaty is an autonomous Treaty
standard and must be interpreted, in light of the object and purpose of the Treaty. . . In applying this
standard, the Tribunal will have due regard to all relevant circumstances."). This tribunal operated under
UNCITRAL Rules, as did the one in the Lilly case. See supra note 49.
210. Arbitral tribunals are not bound by the parties' statements about their intention when
entering into the agreement and tend not to pay much attention to the travaux. See supra notes 87-92
and accompanying text.
211. Petersmann, supra note 171, at 65.
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This opens a door for an ISDS tribunal to bring human rights and other key
public policy objectives in its analytical mix, especially in cases where the specific
solutions proposed in the last Part of this Article have not been applied to the
applicable IIA.
3. StipulationforAnother
Another contract-based approach reflects the fact that investor-state
mechanisms contained in investment treaties between two or more states (or the
investment chapter of a trade agreement) are not for the benefit of any of the parties
to the "contract." This doctrinal mechanism is specific to the ISDS context and,
hence, there is no need to compare its application in the trade and investment
realms.
ISDS is arguably what French law calls a "stipulation pour autrui" (stipulation
for another), which French law defines as follows:
There is stipulation for another where, in a contract, one of the parties,
called the stipulator, stipulates to the other, called the promisor that the
latter shall give or do something for the benefit of an extraneous third
party, the beneficiary who thereby becomes a creditor without having been
a party to the contract.212
While theoretically prohibited in French law, there are many cases in which
such stipulations are allowed.213 In a common law context, establishing a third party
right of suit in a contract may be said to offend the privity of contract. Privity implies
that "a third party cannot be subjected to a burden by a contract to which he is not
a party," but this does not fully answer the question whether allowing a third party to
benefit from the contract, may imply, if the third party chooses to accept this
benefit, also an obligation on that third party.214 A privity-based approach has been
applied in a treaty context in asking, for example, whether Paris Club practice of not
requiring the rescheduling of bilateral obligations to the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank creates a right to sue for the Fund and the Bank.215 It is
212. A. WEILL & F. TERRE, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 549 (1986), translated in Gordon
Humphreys & Andrew Higg, Waybills: A Case of Common Law Laissez Faire in European Commerce,
J. Bus. L. (UK) 453, 465 (1992).
213. Humphreys and Higg, supra note 212, at 466. The German civil code (BGB) "provides
explicitly in § 328 that a contract may be made for the benefit of a third party, thus giving the third
party a right to demand performance." Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational
Commercial Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORD-LAM INT'L L.J. 1557, 1595 (2013); see also Hendrik
Verhagen, Contemporar Law, in CONTRACTS FOR A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY: A HISTORICAL AND
COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 137 (Jan Hallebeek & Harry Dondorp eds., 2008).
214. Andres Guadamuz Gonzalez, Viral Contracts or Unenforceable Documents? Contractual
Validity of Copyleft Licences, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 331, 336-37 (2004).
215. Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Preferred Creditor Status Under International Law: The Case of
the International Monetary Fund, 39 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 801, 815-16 (1990) (noting also that "[w]ith
respect to the law of treaties the view has been taken that the beneficiary of a 'stipulation pour autrui'
can only in the case of an actual right invoke directly and on its own account the provision conferring
the benefit.").
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also reflected in the VCLT itself, which provides both that "[a] treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent," and that a "right
arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend
the provision to accord that right either to the third State . . . and the third State
assents thereto. "216 At common law, third party beneficiary status arises "when
parties make a valid contract which contains provisions evidencing a clear intent to
operate for the benefit of the third party."
217
This is not radical thinking. If A sells her house to B, but stipulates that C can
live in part of the house if C pays rent, then C can "trigger" the right to live in the
house, but has the corresponding obligation to pay rent. Similarly, if D takes
insurance for E's benefit, then the insurance company can claim unpaid premiums
from E before paying the benefit. Article 5.2.1 of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law's (UNIDROIT) Principles of International Commercial
Contracts provides a rule for contracts in favor of third parties, which states in part
that the "existence and content of the beneficiary's right against the promisor are
determined by the agreement of the parties and are subject to any conditions or other
limitations under the agreement.218 The Comment to this Article notes in this respect
that "the promisor and promisee enjoy broad powers to shape the rights created in
favour of the beneficiary."
219
Would it be conceivable to use this notion to suggest hat corporations using
ISDS must comply with certain obligations? This is a possibly fruitful dimension to
explore further. Providing corporations with a right to sue states under an IIA
implies that corporations have a legal personality at international law. The argument
one could make is that this attribution of legal personality comes with a very
important right (to sue states in a separate tribunal), but it could also imply certain
obligations, including upholding human rights.
220 Put differently, if a corporation
gets personality and the right to sue, can the sued state demand compliance with
216. VCLT, supra note 87, arts. 34, 36 1 1; see also Jimenez de Arechaga, Treaty Stipulations in
Favor of Third States, 50 AM.J. INT'L L. 338, 356 (1956).
217. William C. Walter & Michael V. Cory, Jr., The Circumvention of Mississippi's Prohibition of
Direct Actions, 66 MISS. L.J. 493, 501 (1997). For example, in my Law School's jurisdiction (Tennessee)
"the requisites necessary to establish a third party beneficiary relationship are: (1) a valid contract made
upon sufficient consideration between the promisor and promisee; and (2) the clear intent to have the
contract operate for benefit of a third party." United Am. Bank of Memphis v. Gardner, 706 S.W.2d
639 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
218. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
art. 5.2.1(2), at 161 (2010) (emphasis added), http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/
principles20lO/integralversionprinciples
20lO-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4R7-CTTU].
219. Id. at 163.
220. Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational
Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRA.NSNAT'L L. 483, 527 (2001) ("[ln the Reparations Case the
International Court ofjustice found that the United Nations enjoyed international legal personality but
did not have the same rights and duties as a state under international law. This principle of limited
international legal personality could be applied to MNCs as well. A duty for MNCs to uphold selected
human rights, created by an investment treaty, would be enforceable by states under international law
without expanding the rights of MNCs under international law.") (notes omitted).
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any international obligations, as it could against the state where the corporation is
established? Enforcement of human rights violations against multinational
corporations is not unheard of: parallels have been drawn in that context to the
Alien Tort Statute.221
As Professor Alzarez observed in that respect:
Under investor-state arbitration, therefore, states are mostly passive
participants in a game controlled by corporate plaintiffs in which the latter
play the jurisgenerative role that in the WTO and throughout much of
international law is formally reserved to states ... . [M]ost BITs and
FTAs ... explicitly provide investors with the ability to pursue their claims
vis-a-vis states at the international level. To the extent the ICJ concluded
in the Reparation Case that the ability to act as a person is the principal
determinant of personhood status, the same conclusion can even more
readily be drawn with respect to corporations and other investors under
the international investment regime.222
In sum, contract-based approaches can, in keeping with the VCLT, provide a
means to fill gaps in texts by using international norms not contained in the text
but part of the context at the time of its establishment, or relevant to the parties for
other reasons, including subsequent practice. A stzfulation pour autrui/privity
doctrinal approach goes a step further and allows one at least to ask whether
corporations meant to be the beneficiaries of ISDS may also, when given the right
to sue states, have certain obligations. In contrast, efficient breach does not seem a
promising way forward. In Part IV, the notion of obligations imposed on
corporations will form part of the discussion on ways forward.
D. Express Interfaces
1. Trade
IIAs can and often do contain express interfaces with human rights and public
policy writ large. These interfaces typically take the form of speafic human rights
exceptions or general ones allowing the exercise of the "right to regulate."223 This
221. See Carolyn A. D'Amore, Sosa v. AlvareZ-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How Wide
Has the Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open, 39 AKRON L. REv. 593, 626-27 (2006)
("Human rights activists will seize on to the [Alien Tort Statute] as a means to redress the violations of
the host nations where multinational corporations are often immersed in human rights predicaments.").
But see Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 310
(2004) (discussing the immunity from responsibility for human rights violations that corporations have
traditionally enjoyed); Christiana Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identfiing
and Defining CIL Post Sosa v. Alvare,-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 105, 106 (2005) (arguing that
multinational corporations are not socially responsible); David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rghts,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 55 (2005) (explaining how international standards often fail to restrain the
behavior of corporations).
222. Jose E. Alvarez,Are Corporations "Subjects" ofInternational Law?, 9 SANTA CLARAJ. iNT'L
L. 1, 11-12 (2011).
223. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 52
(2014).
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"right to regulate" in relation to IIAs may be defined as "a legal right that permits
a departure from specific investment commitments assumed by a State on the
international plane without incurring a duty to compensate."
224 At least in a
functioning democracy, it could also be defined as "an affirmation of states'
authority to act as sovereigns on behalf of the will of the people."
225 Specific
interfaces in IIAs provide for identified regulatory measures to be taken without
violating their commitments and obligations contained in bilateral, regional or
multilateral trade agreements. By contrast, general interfaces take the form of an
open-ended exception affirming the state's right to adopt certain regulations.
The most important general interfaces in international trade law are arguably
the exceptions contained in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. The latter
targets, inter alia, measures "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public
order', 'necessary to protect human . . . life or health."
226 Similar exceptions are
found in the trade portion of a number of IIAs. 2
27 General interfaces do not
prescribe the type of measure that can be taken by the state, only a standard against
which they can be measured.228 Admittedly, recourse to general interfaces has not
been very successful in the TRIPS context at the WTO, but then there have been
relatively few cases.
229
The TRIPS Agreement does contain both general and specific interfaces with
human rights. It states, first, a general exception: "Members may adopt measures
necessay to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement."230 Second, TRIPS contains a specific exception allowing WTO
members to exclude from patentability inventions "the prevention within their
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessay to protect ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
231 Both
those TRIPS interfaces are cabined by the use of the term "necessary."
232 The use
224. Id.
225. MOUYAL, supra note 164, at 8.
226. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994).
227. SeeJulien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health
Protections-Is a General Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 336-41
(2013) (discussing instruments incorporating the WTO "General Exceptions" clause in one form or
another in IIAs).
228. Seeid at 333 ("IA] new trend is emerging in treaty practice consisting of including a 'general
exceptions' clause, which governments hope will provide greater regulatory flexibility and serve
pursuing public interest objectives . . . .").
229. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROC-IELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 186 (2012).
230. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 27, art. 8.1.
231. Id. art. 27.2.
232. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 195, at 1205 (reviewing WTO jurisprudence and noting
that the "Appellate Body further said, '[D]etermination of whether a measure, which is not
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of this term seems to posit (as a normative matter) that trade liberalization
commitments should trump but for the necessity to adopt certain regulatory
measures. It does not specify the burden of proof (who must show necessity and
how), but there is WTO jurisprudence on that point.233
Language matters.234 Providing a "right to regulate," often in an IIA provision
bearing that as its title, can be significantly constrained by a "provided that such
measures are consistent with provisions of this Agreement" clause, as in TRIPS
Article 8.1 for example.235 Then the right to regulate might be a general "public
interest" clause offering broad flexibility, but it may also limit the scope to specific
public interests (plural), such as labor or environmental standards.236 Another
consideration is that a country that adds this right to regulate (as the United States
did in its model BIT in 2004) might prompt an investor to argue that earlier IIAs
do not, a contratio, provide regulatory flexibility. 237
Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss proposed a "neofederalist" model of
international IP in the TRIPS context that offers additional guidance on the
interpretation of exceptions. Their approach considers an international acquis that
the DSB should incorporate into the TRIPS framework using both general and
specific interfaces.238 As they note, now that trade and intellectual property were
joined at the hip (by the TRIPS Agreement) "linkage to a broader array of norms is
inevitable."239 They argue "detaching TRIPS adjudication from the rich fabric of
other international initiatives would distort the creative environment and ignore
important values, such as commitments to free speech and distributive justice."240
They suggest, inter alia, that the DSB make more room for generalexceptions, which
states often use to safeguard interests outside intellectual property.241
Clearly, there is still work to be done-some of it by the WTO Appellate
Body-to clarify the trade and intellectual property interface. Yet doctrinal avenues
have been ploughed, at least at the theoretical level. The pending plain packaging
cases at the WTO may present an occasion for the Appellate Body to put some of
them in actual motion.242 Can that help solve our ISDS challenge?
"indispensable", may nevertheless be "necessary" . . . involves in every case a process of weighing and
balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance
measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests
or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports."').
233. See id at 1206-07.
234. See TITI, supra note 223, at 111-15.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 99-100.
237. See id. at 295.
238. DINWOODIE & DREYFuss, supra note 229, at 160.
239. Id
240. Id.
241. See id. at 186.
242. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 195, at 1214 ("[T]here is a need for a balanced and
methodical approach by the WTO. Both the VCLT and previous panel and Appellate Body reports
contain the tools that are needed to get to a balanced outcome.").
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2. ISDS
Express interfaces between the right to regulate and ISDS increasingly often
find their way in the investment chapter of HAs, sometimes with the specific
purpose to exclude an evaluation by an ISDS tribunal or substantive intellectual
property rules, or to maintain regulatory flexibility (and in the latter case sometimes
a link is made with human rights, as the examples discussed in the following lines
should demonstrate). In both the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), substantive
intellectual property is at least partly excluded from ISDS scrutiny, for example, a
move perhaps informed by the filing of the Lilly case. Indeed the Tribunal in that
case did not hesitate to equate patents with investment-even though a
patent may be issued in a country where none of the expenses related to the
development of the invention took place. 243 The exclusion of IP was done in CETA
by adding a declaration that provides both that "investor-State dispute settlement
tribunals ... are not an appeal mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts,"
and that "the domestic courts of each Party are responsible for the determination
of the existence and validity of intellectual property rights."
244 Moreover, CETA
reasserts "each Party shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement regarding intellectual property
within their own legal system and practice."245 In October 2016, after opposition
from the French-speaking part of Belgium, it was agreed that the ISDS provisions
of CETA would be submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union to
determine their compatibility with EU law, in particular the ability of EU member
States to implement and enforce public policy and fundamental rights.
246
Similarly, the European text proposal for the TTIP provides that:
For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation or creation of
intellectual property rights to the extent that these measures are consistent
with TRIPS and Chapter X (Intellectual Property) of this Agreement, do
not constitute expropriation. Moreover, a determination that these actions
are inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement or Chapter X (Intellectual
Property) of this Agreement does not establish that there has been an
expropriation.
247
243. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Final Award, supra note 2, ¶ 167.
244. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada of the One Part,
and the European Union, of the Other Part, Annex 8-D, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_ 152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/
64AC-NJCM] Ihereinafter CETA].
245. Id. art. X. 11, ¶ 6; see also Vadi, supra note 76, at 191.
246. See Laurens Ankersmit, Investment Court System in CETA to Be judged by the ECJ,
EUR. L. BLOG (Oct. 31, 2016), http://europearilawblog.eu/2016/10/31/investment-court-system-in-
ceta-to-be-judged-by-the-ecj/ [https://perma.cc/XSM8-JH5j].
247. EUROPEAN UNION, PROPOSAL FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND RESOLUTION OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP, TRADE IN
SERVICES, INVESTMENT AND E-COMMERCE, CHAPTER II - INVESTMENT art. 5(7), at 6 (2015),
[Vol. 8:459502
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The free trade agreement between Australia and the United States also
contains a general carve out in ISDS for public health purposes.248 NAFTA parties
presumably could add a similar one to Chapter 11 (with the risks that any reopening
of NAFTA entails),249 or one similar to the exclusion added to CETA, and in the
EU-proposed TTIP text if doubts as to the intent and meaning of Article 1110(7)
remain.250
An interesting change can also be observed in the model U.S. BIT.251 The
initial model dates back to 1977 and its main focus was on the protection of foreign
investments by U.S. companies.252 In the wake of ISDS cases against the United
States and the increasing recognition that "bilateral" implies that foreign companies
can invest in, and sue the government of, the United States, the model BIT was
revised in 2004 to note that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations."253 The avenue explored there-namely the
systematic exclusion of an evaluation of compliance with substantive intellectual
property obligations by ISDS tribunals-is common in more recent trade
agreements concerning other key areas, such as labor, environment and sustainable
development. Indeed, they are contained in the majority of post-WTO (1995) trade
agreements negotiated by the EU. 254 They often refer to a list of international
conventions setting out applicable standards that a state (or the EU itself) has the
right to implement.255 Safeguards for labor, environment and sustainable
development often explicitly demand a "high level of protection" and put these
interests expressly above that of liberalization of trade. For example, under Article
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc- 53955.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CKQ8-Y5HA].
248. Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 17.9(7), Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004, 43
I.L.M. 1248.
249. See Melissa Long, Recent Developments in NAFTA, 14 L. & BUS. REV. Am. 875, 879 (2008)
(noting that under President George W. Bush, the "Administration has been and will continue to be
clear and consistent in strongly opposing requests to reopen this agreement" due to risk to US
exporters).
250. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
251. See MOUYAL, supra note 164, at 71-73.
252. See id.
253. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 55, annex B(4)(b). The 2012 language is unchanged on
this point from the 2004 model, as a request to remove "except in rare circumstances" was rejected. See
MOUYAL, supra note 164, at 72.
254. CETA, supra note 244, arts. 22.1, 23.2, 24.3; Free Trade Agreement
Between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore art. 13.1(1), May 2015 [hereinafter
E.U.-Singapore FTA]; Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States,
of the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part arts. 269(3), 270(2), 2012 O.J. (L 354) 3
[hereinafter E.U.-Peru & Columbia FTA]; Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central
America, on the One Hand, and the European Union and Its Member States, on the Other
art. 286(1)-(2), 2012 O.J. (L 346) 3 [hereinafter E.U.-Central America Association Agreement]; Free
Trade Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and the
Republic of Korea, of the Other Part arts. 13.4, 13.5, 2014 O.J. (L 140) 3 [hereinafter E.U.-Korea FTA].
255. See articles of agreements cited supra note 254.
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23.2 of CETA, the parties "seek to ensure those laws and policies provide for and
encourage high levels of labour protection and shall strive to continue to improve
such laws and policies with the goal of providing high levels of labour
protection."256
In addition to these provisions, some IIAs include recognition by the parties
that "it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing
the protections afforded in domestic labour and environment laws."
257 The
Association Agreement between the EU and Central America goes a step further in
its Article 291(2) which requires parties "not to waive or derogate from, or offer to
waive or derogate from, its labour or environmental legislation in a manner affecting
trade or as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or
retention of an investment or an investor in its territory."
258 In addition, paragraph
three demands that a party "shall not fail to effectively enforce its labour and
environmental legislation in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties."259
Systematic exclusion of certain policy areas, in whole or in part (that is, by
applying a stricter test), is thus a clearly useful tool to consider as we now turn to
this Article's proposed solutions.
V. SPECIFIC WAYS FORWARD
A. The Pu.Z-Ile
The puzzle this Article attempts to contribute to solving is to build proper
interfaces between a state's right-indeed often its duty-to regulate to protect
human rights and key public policy areas, on the one hand, and the protection of
investment contained in thousands of IIAs when this protection takes the form of
a complaint filed by a multinational corporation against a host state in an ISDS
proceeding. States need "regulatory space of manoeuvre to promote social
welfare . . . and to live up to international human rights commitments."
260 If the
state's hands are tied in such a way that it can no longer respond adequately to
changing circumstances-whether those changes be social, environmental or
technological-by adapting their social and economic policies, then the advantages
that states see in encouraging foreign investment through ISDS will fade and trigger
public opinion backlash-as recent European events have demonstrated.
261 The
sustainability of investment protection is at stake.
256. A similar provision is contained in E.U.-Singapore FTA, supra note 254, art. 13.2(2), and
E.U.-Peru & Columbia FTA, supra note 254, art. 268.
257. E.U.-Singapore FTA, supra note 254, art. 13.1(3); E.U.-Central America Association
Agreement, supra note 254, art. 291 (1).
258. E.U.-Central America Association Agreement, supra note 254, art. 291(2).
259. Id.
260. MOUYAL, supra note 164, at 19.
261. See Peter Muchlinksi, Polic Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK Of INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 60 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christopher Schreuer eds., 2008).
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B. Parameters of an Optimal Human Rights/ISDS Interface
Is ISDS a way to circumvent shortcomings that companies see in state-to-state
multilateral dispute settlement? The question is worth asking.262 Recall that ISDS
was originally meant as defensive measure for companies stripped of assets by
expropriation, often for purposes of nationalization of those assets by a state.263
ISDS has morphed into a "potent offensive strategic tool" to effectuate policy
changes to domestic norms concerning environmental protection, intellectual
property, and other regulatory areas.264As far as intellectual property is concerned,
as Joost Pauwelyn has observed, there have been few TRIPS cases, and some of
them left a bitter after taste in the mouths of corporate actors who had pushed for
the cases to be filed.265 Those cases were not rejected on the basis of human rights
or extrinsic (non-WTO) norms, however.
The answer is not to oppose the grant to corporations (non-state actors) of a
right to sue states. Governments may have incentives not to file cases against other
governments, including lack of resources, diplomatic relations, etc. Non-state
actors, including well-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGO), can
supplement he "enforcement" activity of states.266
The issue with ISDS is different and specific. It is that only a very narrow
category of non-state actors (multinational investors) have been given an
extraordinary lever to achieve policy aims; tribunals with broad powers and
dedicated to the task of investment protection have been established with a sole
purpose: to hear their grievances about states.267 The risk is that those firms will use
ISDS as "vertical forum-shifting to achieve results that they know would be
unacceptable if debated and considered openly and multilaterally."268 Some
262. See Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration: Do International
Investment Agreements Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Propery Rghts?, 2010 Y.B. INT'L
INV. L. & POL'Y 397, 398.
263. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT'L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., NAFTA's
CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IM-PACTS OF THE INVESTOR-
STATE PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XH7-DFPG].
264. Id.
265. See generall Pauwelyn, supra note 82.
266. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance,
18 MICH.J. INT'L L. 183, 285 (1997); Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of udgments: The
Debate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 44, 87 (2001).
267. ISDS "remedies" are not an obligation to change the law but rather an obligation for the
state at fault to compensate the complainant. However, the imposition or risk of imposition of very
large awards (Lilly's claim is in the order of C$500 million) will likely lead governments to effect policy
changes or not make ones that multinational investors do not want to see implemented to avoid the
disputes. See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 162, at 574 ("[W]hen the United States failed to conform
to the 1999 US-110(5) decision, it paid the EU, pursuant to further WTO arbitration, $3.3 million to
cover a three-year period .... In an investment dispute Eli Lilly brought against Canada over its patent
rights, it demanded CDN $500 million. That difference could have a considerable impact on the
willingness of countries to draft laws that test the limits of international flexibilities.") (citations
omitted).
268. Sell, supra note 152, at 318.
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commentators have gone a step further and argued that flexibilities in trade rules
could be "closed" using ISDS, such as exhaustion (parallel imports).
269
The question with respect to human rights is whether ISDS should interpret
and "factor in" human rights obligations to "balance" investment protection in a
deeper normative pool. As explicated in Part IV, some scholars believe that trade
tribunals must consider human rights (including those that mesh with trade
liberalization). Others carefully explicate how and why under the VCLT they can do
so.270 In this Article's view, they most certainly can do so. The constitutional and
contract-based approaches reviewed in Part IV are certainly worth investigating,
even though they lead to a risk that human rights and other key public policy
objectives will play second fiddle in an orchestra of norms conducted by trade
law.271
This Article suggests that human rights obligations brought to the attention of
an ISDS tribunal should be fully considered in interpreting the scope and depth of
the regulatory leeway used by the State before an unjustified (that is, one that leads
to an obligation to compensate the investor) violation of its investment obligations
is found. How the second prong can be effectuated is discussed in the next section.
C. Directed Interpretation
An optimal solution to the puzzle described in the opening section of this Part
would do more than just require ISDS tribunals to "consider" human rights
obligations: dispute settlement bodies should be directed to avoid any interpretation
of the IIAs that would contravene a human rights obligation undertaken by the State whenever
possible, a global "Charming Betsy" doctrine, as it were.
272 The VCLT indicates the
path to follow: when a text's meaning is obscure or ambiguous a broader context,
269. See Baker & Geddes, supra note 49, at 32 ("Article 6 prohibits resort to interstate dispute
settlement with respect to IP exhaustion rules, but it does not directly permit or authorize international
exhaustion, otherwise known as parallel importation. Accordingly, a disgruntled pharmaceutical
company could very easily object to the importation and sale of a medicine it had sold more cheaply
elsewhere claiming that parallel importation had violated its expectation of patent-based market
segmentation and higher profits in certain markets.") (footnote omitted).
Under the TRIPS Agreement, WTO members agreed to disagree on exhaustion. Article 6 of
TRIPS provides that "[flor the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the
provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 27, art. 6.
270. Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmoniging Investment Protection and International
Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 678, 692-97 (Christine Binder et
al., eds., 2009).
271. See generally Alston, supra note 3.
272. The Charming Betsy doctrine is a U.S. doctrine of statutory interpretation named after the
schooner Charming Betsy seized in 1800 in open seas by a U.S. frigate. It led to a Supreme Court opinion,
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betgy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804). The Supreme Court stated that an "act of Congress




including other relevant instruments can-some might say should-be factored
in.
27 3
Applied to the ISDS context, following this proposed canon would mean that
when an interpretation of the notions of direct or indirect expropriation and fair
and equitable treatment in an investment protection chapter can be reconciled with
a state's regulatory autonomy in an area of vital socio-economic importance and/or
a state's implementation of its human rights obligations, then that interpretation
should be preferred.274 This would have a "normative stabilizing effect, at a time
when there are few agreed answers about the costs and benefits of globalization or
the ideal shape of global economic governance in relation to differing domestic
policy paths."275 WTO jurisprudence on the use of regulatory flexibilities within
boundaries set by trade commitments and obligations under WTO instruments
could inform the determination of the appropriate scope and reach of the state's
regulatory elasticity.
As already detailed, an explicit mechanism exists at the WTO to effectuate this
policy.276 In the ISDS context, it is admittedly harder. After all, there are thousands
of existing HAs that contain investment provisions.277 Realistically they cannot all
be amended, although bulk actions, such as pulling out of all of them at once has
been used.278 The idea of amending the VCLT itself, the provisions of which have
achieved canonical status, also seems far-fetched.279 Issues of retroactive application
of new interpretation norms that have no claim to customary law would emerge.280
273. See supra Section II.C.
274. The "area of vital socio-economic importance" is taken from Article 8.1 of TRIPS. See
supra note 230 and accompanying text ("Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary ... to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to their socio-economic and technological development. . . ."). On the interpretation of regulatory
flexibility, see Robert Howse, The World Trade OrganiZation 20 Years On: Global Governance by
Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 9, 76 (2016) ("[T~be Appellate Body sought to discern in the corpus of
WTO treaties an equilibrium between domestic regulatory autonomy and trade liberalization very much
inspired by, or anchored in, the original GATT - a respect for regulatory diversity and flexibility towards
domestic policy interventions . .. .").
275. Howse, supra note 274, at 76.
276. Namely the general exception. See Chaisse, supra note 227.
277. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
278. For example, in answer to questions at the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) onJuly 25, 2016,
the Indian Minister of Trade and Industry noted that "[o]ut of the total 83 [bilateral investment] treaties
signed by India so far, 58 treaties are being terminated." See GOV'T OF INDIA, DEP'T OF INDUS. POLICY
& PROMOTION, UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 1290. To BE ANSWERED ON MONDAY, THE 25THJULY,
2016. (2016), http:/ /dipp.nic.in/sites/default/files/lul290.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8KY-R9US].
279. SeeJonathan Pratter, Treaty Research Basics, 89 L. LIBR.J. 407, 408 (1997) (referring to the
"canonical definition of 'treaty' found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"). Proposals
to amend the VCLT surface regularly but they strike the Author as unlikely. See, e.g., Christopher
J. Borgen, Resolving Treat'y Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 573, 637 (2005); Michael
B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and Immunity, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 475, 476 (1997).
280. Although this would require a longer discussion, VCLT art. 28 provides for non-
retroactivity of treaties. As to the status of VCLT interpretive rules as customary international law, see
Eirik Bjorge, The Vienna Rules on Treaty Interpretation Before Domestic Courts, 131 L. Q. REV. 78, 80
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A different option would be to have a special convention. In early 2017, the
EU launched consultations on a Multilateral Investment Court, a permanent court
to be established for this purpose in TTIP. 281 That new court could theoretically
come up with interpretive principles to the same effect as those described above,
but this seems unlikely to the Author given that investment protection is ISDS'
normative lodestar.282 This Article suggests that "Vienna Plus" interpretive
principles could be included in the convention (statute) establishing the new court
to reflect recent understandings about ISDS. Naturally, if the new court only bound
EU-related ISDS it would not directly affect IIAs not involving the EU. However,
jurisprudence might emerge from this court that might influence other arbitral
tribunals.283 If the court was established not as a "pure" EU court, but instead a
multilateral one, it could attract other nations that would either reorient existing
investor-state disputes arising out of existing IIAs or use it for future ones.
In the EU context, one must keep an eye on the referral to the Court ofjusice
of the European Union about CETA's ISDS mechanism that the Walloons
(French-speaking Belgians) obtained.284 The Court has already expressed doubts
about the constitutional validity of "external" tribunals, especially when those
tribunals' findings may clash with the fundamental rights contained in the EU
Charter.285
(2015), for a reference to "customary international law of treaty interpretation, as reflected in arts 31-
33 of the Vienna Convention" (footnote omitted).
281. See Questionnaire on Options for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute
Resolution, EUR. COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul-id=233
[https://perma.cc/DV9j-AHWWJ (last visited June 21, 2018); see also Ben Stanford, Andreas Yiannaros.
& Chrispas Nyombi, TTIP Negotiations in the Shadow of Human Rights and Democratic Values, 27 1NT'L
COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 316, 319 (2016) ("In November 2015, following an extremely critical public
consultation into the ISDS model which is commonly used in similar but smaller-scale trade agreements,
the Commission revealed that it would instead pursue proposals for an investment court to be included
in the TTIP.") (citations omitted).
282. See supra text accompanying note 189.
283. See David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 344-47 (2007) (referring to
NAFTA's ISDS jurisprudence). It should be noted also that cross-fertilization between trade and
investment jurisprudence has been modest, sometimes for good reasons. Seejoost Pauwelyn & Nicolas
DiMascio, Non-Discrimination in Trade and Investment Trealies: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same
Coin?, 102 A.J.I.L. 48 (2008).
284. Wallonia obtained that the EU Commission should ask the Court of justice of
the European Union to examine the compatibility of the ISDS provisions contained in CETA
with EU Law, in particular the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. See Milan Schreuer, Ilow




285. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Can the EU's Disregardfor "Strict Observance of International
Law" (Article 3 TEU) Be Constitutionally Justified?, in TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE EU
AND BEYOND (Inge Govaere, Reinhard Quick & Marco Bronckers eds., 2011).
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D. Expressy Reserving Regulatory Autonomy
A strongly worded interface should direct ISDS tribunals to refrain from
stepping on the regulatory autonomy of States promoting their population's public
health, both because these are sectors of "vital importance"-to use the
terminology of TRIPS Article 8.1-and because the regulatory measures at issue are
a means of implementing the right to health. This is particularly true in patent cases
concerning pharmaceuticals because in such cases looking solely at an investor's
alleged losses misses several key parts of the policy picture. This can be done
negatively by limiting the scope of ISDS, or positively by adding to investment
instruments an appropriately worded "right to regulate" clause.
A good example is the exclusion of substantive IP rules from ISDS in both
CETA and TTIP.2 86 The European Union is not alone. Recall that both Mexico and
the United States came to Canada's defense in the Lilly case, not as much on the
interpretation of the patent provisions of NAFTA, but in the role of ISDS in this
context.287 Australia supported the inclusion of a countervailing right to regulate to
limit the reach of "pure" investment rules rather than by restricting the scope of
ISDS. In a statement on trade policy issued in 2011, the government of Australia
noted that it "does not support provisions that would confer greater legal rights on
foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses. Nor will the
Government support provisions that would constrain the ability of Australian
governments to make laws on social, environmental, and economic matters in
circumstances where those laws do not discriminate between domestic and foreign
businesses."288
E. Imposing Obligations on Investors
The marked reluctance of international investment law to "take adequate
account of the public interest and to integrate principles from international
environmental and human rights law is out of step with current trends in public
international law." 289 Would imposing obligations on investors-perhaps using the
doctrine of stipulation for another-that at present claim rights under ISDS
provisions lead to a more balanced outcome?290 Weisbrodt and Kruger asked
whether it was "appropriate to place human rights obligations upon organizations
whose primary purpose is to produce profit or effectively deliver goods or
286. Previous IIAs were bilateral, that is, entered into not by the E.U. but with individual
member states.
287. Interestingly, CETA was the first E.U. IIA containing an ISDS mechanism. See supra note
244 and accompanying text.
288. AUSTRALIAN Gov'T, DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, GiLLARD GOVERNMENT
TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14 (2011),
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/201 1Gillard%20Govt/o20Trade%2OPolicy/20Statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/832N-F6VT).
289. Miles, supra note 145, at 296.
290. See supra Section IV.C.3.
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services."291 They answer in the affirmative, noting that a "widely accepted" set of
human rights norms would create more predictability and "establish a level playing
field for business competition."2
92 Ratner has argued along similar lines that
"business enterprises will have duties both insofar as they cooperate with those
actors whom international law already sees as the prime sources of abuses-states-
and insofar as their activities infringe upon the human dignity of those with whom
they have special ties."293 Yet, one must admit that, as Forman and Kohler rightly
note, "the application of human rights to non-state actors like the pharmaceutical
industry is not a settled question within international law."
294 Still, at the domestic
level at least, India and South Africa have cases demonstrating that domestic courts
can impose access obligations on patent holders based on the human right to
health.295 A possible forum for further discussion on this issue is the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is discussing
National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights (NAPs) as part of its
Responsible Business Conduct Initiative.
296
F. Factoring in Unintended Consequences
Unintended consequences are so common that their existence is said to be a
"law." 297 A win for Lilly in its ISDS claim against Canada would likely have had
unintended consequences. A win for Lilly would have created a strong incentive for
patent offices to be extremely (or at least more) careful in the pharmaceutical sector
in the case of dubious applications-perhaps such as the "species within a genus"
type of application at issue in the Lilly case-and possibly other industrial fields
where major multinational players have the wherewithal to challenge a state's
invalidation decisions in an ISDS and claim compensation from its taxpayers.
298 A
291. David Weissbordt & Muria Kruger, Human Rights Responsibilities of .Businesses as Non-
State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIG+1TS 315, 335 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
292. Id. at 335-36.
293. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 449 (2001).
294. Lisa Forman & Jillian C. Kohler, Introduction: Access to Medicines as a Human Right -
What Does It Mean for Pharmaceutical Industry Responsibilities?, in ACCESS TO MEDICINES AS A HUMAN
RIGHT: IMPLICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RESPONSIBILITY 3,9 (Lisa Forman &J illian
C. Kohler eds., 2012).
295. See Emmanuel K. Oke, Using the Right to.Health to Enforce the Corporate Responsibilities of
Pharmaceutical Companies with Regard to Access to Medicines, 1 J. HEALTH DIPL. 1, 5-12 (2013).
296. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & D.Ev., SUMMARY REPORT: 2017 ROUNDTABLE




297. See Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 684
(2010) (discussing the "law" of unintended consequences in regulatory theory).
298. The rule against double-patenting prevents an applicant from claiming a genus if an earlier-
issued patent contains claims to a species of the genus because the genus is anticipated by the species
but a claim to a genus does not prevent a claim to a species within the genus. As the Federal Circuit
noted in a case (involving Lilly in fact): "ICiase law firmly establishes that a later genus claim limitation
is anticipated by, and therefore not patentably distinct from, an earlier species claim." Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 971 (Fed. Cit. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1109 (2002).
[ ol. 8: 59510
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
second incentive logically created by a win would have been that patent offices
should look long and hard before issuing pharmaceutical patents if their state coffers
are then tapped for compensation in case of invalidation seen as indirect
expropriation or a failure to meet some FET standard in an ISDS context. How this
would have benefited Lilly and other pharmaceutical companies is not entirely
obvious.
CONCLUSION
Lilly lost the gamble it played when filing its C$500 million investor-state
dispute against Canada.299 The case did, however, provide scholars and the
investment law community with a unique opportunity to reflect on the balancing of
intellectual property, investment, human rights and regulatory autonomy. This
Article briefly reviewed the arguments made by both parties, the award, and
mechanisms that exist to bridge the normative and doctrinal gaps between
intellectual property, human rights, trade, and investment, bearing in mind
important differences between trade (state-to-state) and investor-state disputes. It
proposes several paths forward to prevent future disputes from taking investment
state disputes outside proper channels.
299. Although Lilly's loss was followed by a win, namely the surprising and weakly supported
reversal of policy by the Supreme Court of Canada a few months later. See AstraZeneca Canada
Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943 (Can.).
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